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ABSTRACT 
 
The issue revolving around corporate governance and financial performance has 
always been an essential and critical element for banking sector in Nigeria. Good 
corporate governance practices and establishing a separate risk management 
committee are regarded as important in reducing risk for investors, and improving 
performance. This study investigates the effect of board and risk management 
committee attributes (board size, board independence, board financial knowledge, 
risk management committee independence, risk management committee size, and 
existence of separate risk management committee) on the financial performance of 
listed banks in Nigeria. Furthermore the research used secondary data obtained from 
the annual report of fourteen (14) banks listed in the Nigerian stock exchange for the 
year 2014-2016 with 42 firm-year observations and based on panel data approach. 
Furthermore, the regression estimates are based on random effect. The result 
indicates that board size, board independence, and board financial knowledge exhibit 
a significant negative relationship with ROA. Meanwhile, risk management 
committee independence has a negative insignificant relationship with ROA. 
Furthermore, risk management committee size, and existence of separate risk 
management committee show positive significant relationship with ROA. Besides 
providing suggestion for future research work, this study provides several 
recommendation for regulators and the Nigerian banking industry. 
 
Keywords: board size, board independence, board financial knowledge, risk 
management committee independence, risk management committee size, separate 
risk management committee, firm performance, Nigeria 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Isu yang berkaitan tadbir urus korporat dan prestasi kewangan senantiasa menjadi 
unsur penting dan kritikal bagi sektor perbankan di Nigeria. Amalan tadbir urus 
korporat yang baik dianggap penting dalam mengurangkan risiko bagi pelabur, 
menarik modal pelaburan dan meningkatkan prestasi. Kajian ini menyiasat hubungan 
antara jawatan kuasa dan ciri-ciri jawatan kuasa pengurusan risiko (saiz lembaga, 
kebebasan lembaga, pengetahuan kewangan lembaga, jawatan kuasa pengurusan 
risiko bebas, saiz jawatan kuasa pengurusan risiko dan kewujudan jawatan kuasa 
pengurusan risiko berasingan) terhadap prestasi kewangan. Kajian menggunakan 
data sekunder yang diperoleh daripada laporan tahunan empat belas (14) bank yang 
disenaraikan di Bursa Saham Nigeria untuk tahun 2014-2016 dengan 42 firma 
tahunan dan berdasarkan pendekatan data panel. Tambahan pula, perkiraan regresi 
berdasarkan kesan rawak. Kajian mendapati bahawa peningkatan dalam saiz 
lembaga, kebebasan lembaga, dan pengetahuan kewangan lembaga lembaga akan 
mengakibatkan penurunan prestasi kewangan. Sementara itu, kebebasan jawatan 
kuasa pengurusan risiko tidak mempunyai hubungan dengan prestasi kewangan. 
Tambahan pula, peningkatan saiz jawatan kuasa pengurusan risiko, dan kewujudan 
jawatan kuasa pengurusan risiko yang berasingan meningkatkan prestasi kewangan. 
Selain menyediakan cadangan untuk penyelidikan masa depan, kajian ini 
menyediakan beberapa cadangan untuk pengawal selia dan industri perbankan 
Nigeria. 
 
Kata kunci: saiz lembaga, kebebasan lembaga, pengetahuan kewangan lembaga, 
kebebasan jawatan kuasa pengurusan risiko, saiz jawatan kuasa pengurusan risiko, 
jawatan kuasa pengurusan risiko yang berasingan, prestasi firma, Nigeria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious and Most Merciful. All my praises and 
gratitude to Allah, the Merciful, the creator and custodian of the Universe for His 
kindness, blessing and guidance which has provided me the strength to face all the 
tribulations and trials in completing this project. No amount of gratitude will suffice 
my Dad and my Mum who guide, natured me and brought me up as a Muslim and 
who laid down the solid foundation for my education dream turned into reality, thank 
you and God Bless. I am also grateful to all other members of my family and other 
well-wishers whose prayers and support has been of tremendous help. 
 
I would like to extend my appreciation to my supervisor, in the person of Assoc. 
Prof. Dr. Hasnah Kamadin for her encouragement, and willingness to support me 
throughout this study. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude for her 
enthusiasm and guidance. The completion of this study has been possible with her 
guidance. I owe a great deal of gratitude to Universiti Utara Malaysia for giving me 
the chance to pursue my higher education and to accomplish my purpose of getting 
this degree, as well as to whole Malaysia (government and friendly people). 
 
Special thanks to my uncle Muhammad Abubakar (baffa) for his supportive and 
encouraging assistance from day one to the end of my programme. I must make 
special mention of my brothers and sisters, Abubakar Haruna Abubakar, Sulaiman 
Abubakar, Aisha Haruna Abubakar, Saad Haruna Abubakar, Hamza Haruna 
Abubakar, Yakubu Haruna Abubakar, Usaini Haruna Abubakar, Rukayya Haruna 
Abubakar, Nusaiba Haruna Abubakar, Sufyan Haruna Abubakar, Maryam Haruna 
Abubakar, Maimuna Haruna Abubakar, Abiddarda’i Haruna Abubakar, 
vi 
 
Abdurrahman Haruna Abubakar, Fatima Haruna Abubkar, Rahma Haruna 
Abubakar, Abduljalil Haruna Abubakar, and Khadija Haruna Abubakar. I pray that 
Allah protect and guide them through all their endeavours. I also wish to extent my 
appreciation to my academic mentors, friends and my professional colleagues who 
gave me moral support and advice, Prof. Dr. Mohd Khairuddin bin Hashim, Prof. 
Madya Dr Norhani binti Aripin, Dr Yurita binti. Abdultalib, Mr Puspakaran A/L 
Kesayan, Dr Mukhtar Musa Bako, Dr Sadiq Rabi’u, Dr Ibrahim Adamu, Dr Adamu 
Idris Adamu, Dr Usaini Bala, Dewi Casmiwati, Abdallah Bala K/Mata, Yan 
Xiaofang, Abubakar Usman, Sadiq Mohammed, Sadiq Aliyu, Peter enofuro, 
muhammed ma’aji, Ahmed taiye, Abubakar Tom, Yaseen Saleh, Yahya Shitty, 
Zainab Babura, Hauwa Atiku, Mohammed Auwal, Abdulkadir Bashir Isa, Jibril 
Abdulqadir Waya, Abba Muhammed, Muhammed Zakari  and all those who have 
assisted me in this study directly or indirectly, whose names are too numerous to be 
mentioned here, may Allah guide and protect them in all their endeavours, Ameen. 
 
Finally, I wish to dedicate this study to my father and my family in general as they 
are always being my strongest supporters. I am indebted to all my family members 
for their love and appreciation throughout my study. 
 
 
Ahmad Haruna Abubakar 
June, 2018 
 
  
vii 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS  
Contents 
PERMISSION TO USE ........................................................................................................................ ii 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................................... iii 
ABSTRAK ............................................................................................................................................ iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................................................................................... v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................... vii 
LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................................ x 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................. xi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................................ xii 
CHAPTER ONE ................................................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background to the Study ..................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Problem Statement ............................................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Research Questions .............................................................................................................. 8 
1.4 Research Objectives ............................................................................................................. 9 
1.5       Significant of the Study ..................................................................................................... 10 
1.6.      Scope and Limitations of the Study ................................................................................. 10 
1.7       Summary of the chapter .................................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER TWO ............................................................................................................................. 13 
Literature Review............................................................................................................................. 13 
2.1.     Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 13 
2.2.     Concept of corporate governance ...................................................................................... 13 
2.3      Evolution of corporate governance in Nigeria ....................................................................... 15 
2.4.    The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance .................................................................. 16 
2.5.    Importance of corporate governance in Nigeria ............................................................... 17 
2.6.    Corporate governance principle and compliance ............................................................. 19 
2.7.    Concept of bank financial performance ............................................................................ 20 
2.8     Corporate Governance Structure ........................................................................................ 22 
2.8.1  Board Size............................................................................................................... 22 
2.8.2. Board Independence ............................................................................................... 25 
2.8.3. Board Financial Knowledge ................................................................................... 27 
2.9.        Risk Management Committee attributes ........................................................................ 29 
2.9.1. RMC Independence ................................................................................................ 29 
2.9.2. RMC Size ............................................................................................................... 30 
2.9.3. Separate RMC......................................................................................................... 31 
2.9. Theoretical Framework .............................................................................................................. 33 
viii 
 
2.9.1. Agency Theory ....................................................................................................... 34 
2.10. Review of Empirical Study .................................................................................................. 35 
2.10. Summary of the Study .......................................................................................................... 39 
CHAPTER THREE ......................................................................................................................... 40 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................. 40 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 40 
3.2. Research Framework .............................................................................................................. 40 
3.3. Hypothesis Development ....................................................................................................... 43 
3.3.1 Financial Performance ............................................................................................. 43 
3.3.2  Return on Asset ...................................................................................................... 44 
3.3.3  Board Size and Financial Performance .................................................................. 44 
3.3.4. Board Independence and Financial Performance ................................................... 46 
3.3.5  Board Financial Knowledge and financial performance ........................................ 47 
3.3.6  RMC Independence and Financial Performance .................................................... 48 
3.3.7. RMC Size ............................................................................................................... 49 
3.3.8. Separate RMC......................................................................................................... 50 
3.4. Research Design ...................................................................................................................... 52 
3.5. Population of the Study .......................................................................................................... 52 
3.5.1  Sample Size and Sampling Technique ................................................................... 52 
3.6. Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection ............................................................... 53 
3.7. Method of Data Analysis........................................................................................................ 54 
3.7.1  Model Specification and Multiple Regressions ...................................................... 54 
3.7.2. Measurement of the Variables ................................................................................ 55 
3.7.2.1. Dependent Variables ............................................................................................ 56 
3.7.2.2. Independent Variables ......................................................................................... 56 
3.7.2.3. Control Variables ................................................................................................. 58 
3.7.2.3.1. Firm Size........................................................................................................... 58 
3.7.2.3.2. Bank Age .......................................................................................................... 59 
3.7.2.3.3. Leverage ........................................................................................................... 59 
3.8. Data Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 62 
3.8.1. Descriptive Analysis ............................................................................................... 62 
3.8.2. Diagnostic Test Panel Data Analysis ...................................................................... 62 
3.8.2.1. Normality Test ..................................................................................................... 63 
3.8.2.2. Heteroscedasticity Test ........................................................................................ 63 
3.8.2.3. Autocorrelation Test ............................................................................................ 64 
3.8.2.4. Multicollinearity Test .......................................................................................... 64 
3.8.3. Correlations ............................................................................................................ 65 
ix 
 
3.8.4. Panel Data Analysis ................................................................................................ 65 
3.8.4.1. Fixed Effect Model .............................................................................................. 65 
3.8.4.2. Random Effect Model ......................................................................................... 66 
3.8.4.3. Hauseman Test .................................................................................................... 66 
3.8.4.4. Breusch and Pegan Langrangian Multiplier Test ................................................ 66 
3.8.5. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis ..................................................................... 67 
3.9. Summary the Chapter ................................................................................................ 67 
CHAPTER FOUR ............................................................................................................................ 68 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................... 68 
4.1. Introduction .............................................................................................................................. 68 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................................... 68 
4.3. Correlation Analysis ............................................................................................................... 70 
4.4. Model Selection between Fixed Effect and Random Effects ............................................ 75 
4.5. Random Effect and Pooled OLS Test ................................................................................... 75 
4.7. Test 2: Test for Heteroskedasticity ....................................................................................... 78 
4.8.  Test 3:  Test for Multicollinearity ........................................................................................ 79 
4.9.  Test 5:  Omitted Variables Test ............................................................................................ 81 
4.10. Test 6: Test for Serial Correlation ....................................................................................... 81 
4.11.1.    (ROA as Dependent Variable) ........................................................................... 83 
4.11.2.    Hypotheses Testing............................................................................................ 83 
4.11.2.1.    Board size and ROA ....................................................................................... 84 
4.11.2.2.    Board independence and ROA ....................................................................... 84 
4.11.2.3.    Board financial knowledge and ROA ............................................................. 85 
4.11.2.4.    Risk management committee independence and ROA .................................. 85 
4.11.2.5.    Risk management committee size and ROA .................................................. 86 
4.11.2.6.    Existence of separate risk management committee and ROA ........................ 86 
4.12. Summary of the Chapter .......................................................................................... 88 
CHAPTER FIVE .............................................................................................................................. 89 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................. 89 
5.1.       Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 89 
5.2.       Summary of the study ....................................................................................................... 89 
5.3.      Implication of the Study ........................................................................................... 90 
5.4.       Limitation of the Study ..................................................................................................... 91 
5.5.       Recommendation for Future Studies .............................................................................. 92 
5.6.       Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 93 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................. 94 
 
x 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 3.1. Listed Banks in Nigeria ………………………………………..   53 
Table 3.2. Summary of the Operationalization of Research Variables ……. 61 
Table 4.1. Summary of Descriptive Statistics ……………………………... 68 
Table 4.2. Pearson correlation …………………………………………......  72 
Table 4.3. Hausman specification test ……………………………………..  75 
Table 4.4. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for  
random effects estimates result …………………………………  75 
Table 4.5 Heteroskedasticity Test …………………………………………. 79 
Table 4.6 Multicollinearity Test using Variance Inflation Factor ………… 80 
Table 4.7 Result of the Estimated Regression ……………………………..  82 
 
 
  
xi 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 Figure 3.1 Research framework ……………………………………………  42 
Figure 4.1 Kernel density estime ………………………………………………… 78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Abbreviation   Description of Abbreviation 
BOARDSIZE   Board of Size 
BOARDINDE   Board Independence 
BOARDFINKNW  Board Financial Knowledge  
RMCSIZE   Risk Management Committee Size 
RMCINDE   Risk Management Committee Independence 
SRMC    Separate Risk Management Committee 
CBN    Central Bank of Nigeria  
BANKAGE    Bank Age  
FIRMSIZE   Firm Size 
SEC    Security and Exchange Commission  
ROA    Return on Asset  
VIF    Variance Inflation Factor  
OECD Organization for Economic Corporate and 
Development 
CAC    Corporate Affairs Commission  
NDIC    Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corp  
CAMA    Company Allied Matters Act 
CEO    Chief Accounting Officer 
1 
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Technology and globalisation are changing. Nevertheless, financial institutions and 
regulators around the world are trying to understand the changes. (Sandeep, Patel & 
Lilicare, 2002). Internationally the banking industry had witnessed many mergers 
and acquisition. As a result of these changes, sound banking system and good 
corporate governance are required by countries. The banking system become 
stronger and able to cope with an open environment (Qi, Wu & Zhang, 2000; and 
Köke & Renneboog, 2002). 
 
Banks are important for economic development because they offer various services. 
Their intermediation function is said to be an incentive for economic development. 
The financial strength in any country depend on the efficient and effective 
performance of the banking industry over time. The level to which a bank give credit 
to the public for productive activities accelerate the speed of a nation’s sustainability 
and economic Growth (Kolapo, Ayeni, & Oke, 2012). Stable banking systems are 
important element of good financial systems, as clearly shown by current growths 
around the world (Barth, Caprio Jr, & Levine, 2001). 
 
Banks are been affected by many factors in trying to comply with several 
consolidation policies. Enforcing a good corporate governance in banks is essential, 
as it will makes the banking system perform efficiently and boost public confidence 
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(Soludo, 2004). Heidi and Marleen (2003), explain that when good corporate 
governance is not established banking supervision cannot function well. 
 
The rules and procedure for making decision on company affairs are stated by 
corporate governance, and also define how responsibilities in the organisation are 
distributed among the shareholders, board, managers and other stakeholders (kajola, 
2008). Consequently, the objective of corporate governance is to protect the 
shareholders with regards to opportunistic behaviour, so as to make managers work 
hard to accomplish shareholders interest in the organisation (Kyereboah-Coleman & 
Biekpe, 2005). 
 
Corporate governance is concern with procedures through which the affairs of 
business and institutions are control, the goal is to enhance shareholder’s value 
through improving corporate accountability and performance, while protecting the 
shareholders interest (Jenkinson & Mayer, 1992). The principle of Good corporate 
governance is promoting fairness, transparency, responsibility and accountability in 
controlling the firm. Best corporate governance practice could result to higher firm 
performance (Young, 2003). 
 
Financial scandals and the recent corporate failure across the globe has reinforced 
the need for corporate governance mostly in developing and developed countries 
(Waweru, 2014). The issue of many breakdown of high profile institutions such 
Enron and Anderson have stunned the business world with scale of their illegal and 
unethical dealings, corporate governance bounced to global business attention. Only 
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tips of the dangerous iceberg are appeared to expose by this organisation. (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 2007). 
 
In Nigeria, corporate governance is been given attention by all the sectors of the 
economy. In 2003 a committee was set up for public companies regarding corporate 
governance known as peterside committee by the Security and exchange committee 
(SEC). Also in August 2003, in response of the serious roles played by corporate 
governance in the collapse or success of Banks in Nigeria a subcommittee was 
established for banks (Ogbechie, 2006). 
 
The first bank of Nigerian was founded in 1892 as the African Banking Corporation. 
They were no banking law, until 1952 when the conventional banking begin with the 
industry experiencing institutional and regulatory improvements. The industry was 
managed by at least 5 out of 89 banks presence before the beginning of the 
restructuring of banking industry in the country. Nigerian banks practice a system of 
many branches, which as at 2004 has an aggregate of 89 banks (Chiemeke, 
Evwiekpaefe, & Chete, 2006). “The industry is likewise confronted with substantial 
difficulties, comprising the persistent cases of failure and distress, a poor capital 
base, loss of public confidence, poor asset quality, over bearing effect of corruption 
and fraud and so on”. Part of the efforts to resolve these current problems contain the 
guidelines issued by Central Bank of Nigeria on banking reform in June 2004, which 
is to a great extent focused at reducing the number of banks and making the uprising 
banks much stronger and reliable (Chiemeke et al., 2006). 
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According to Nimalathasan, (2008) the common Purpose of supporting financial 
performance discussions and research is because, growing financial performance 
analysis will provide improvement in processes and responsibility of the 
organization. Financial performance and research into its dimension is well 
progressive within management and finance discipline. A display of performance 
Indicators is required to disclose the various features of the bank performance 
(Gibson & Cassar, 2005). 
 
Aarma, Vainu and Vensel (2004) implied that performance analysis of banks is an 
important issue in the states of transition economies because of the strategic role 
played during the successful transition of the financial sector. Altman and Hotchkiss 
(2010) stated that ratio analysis is a depiction of the true picture of performance of a 
business at a particular point. Despite the importance of financial ratio analysis in 
providing valuable knowledge to an entities performance, it has some significant 
boundaries as an analytical instrument in analysis of bank performance. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
In Nigeria poor management result to excessive risk taking, inadequate 
administration of loans portfolio and distorted credit management, was among the 
major causes of banking depress (Fries, Neven & Seabright, 2002; & Sanusi, 2010). 
The issue of corporate governance is key in the banking sector and has turned into a 
topic of global concern, it is essential in other to improved services and strengthening 
of financial intermediation with respect to banks and enables appropriate banking 
operations. 
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Boards of directors are the focus of attention for most fraud cases that result to 
collapse of many company, also blamed for corporate failure and the decrease in 
shareholders‟ wealth. In 2009, the banking sector in Nigeria widely reported many 
accounting irregularities. Such as, spring Bank, Fin Bank, Afri Bank, Union Bank, 
Oceanic Bank and Intercontinental Bank was as a result of lack of good supervision 
roles by the board, the board give control to executive management who were after 
their own self-interests (Uadiale, 2010). 
 
Sanusi (2010) explain that governance misconduct among the merge banks has been 
related to banking distress in Nigeria, which has turn to routine practice in the sector. 
Additionally, corporate governance is failed in many banks because of the fact that 
boards are being misinformed by the executive in acquiring loans that are not secured 
and they lack experience to impose good corporate governance practice on the 
management. 
 
Alabede (2012) explain that 8 of 24 banks in Nigerian were identified by the Central 
Bank of Nigeria as distressed, with total 32.8% as nonperforming loans. The chief 
executives and directors of the banks were removed by the CBN as a result of 
corporate financial misconduct and 4.1 billion dedicated for bailout funds for the 
banks that are affected (Ezeoha, 2011). However, the central bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
removed corporate executives because of taking excessive risk, as the banks financial 
executives do not align with the risk management goals. (Adegbite & Nakajima, 
2011). Vives (2011 stressed agency problem make the financial industry shows 
severe market failure arising from too much risk-taking. Inadequate corporate 
governance in banks is the main concern of regulators in protecting banking funds. 
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(Adegbite, 2012). The major issue is some corporate financial leaders have no 
corporate governance strategies to ensure regulatory compliance to enhance firm 
financial performance. 
 
The Nigerian Security and Exchange Commission in 2003, announced the new Code 
of Best Practices for public quoted companies on corporate governance due to calls 
by stakeholders for reinforcement of corporate governance components to improve 
the monitoring functions board of directors and to boost the credibility of financial 
reporting which will improve public confidence , the code was later reviewed in 2011 
to improve its efficiency and effectiveness, the affected companies are required to 
change to the revised procurements (Ofo, 2011). 
 
Board size serve a significant position in influencing firm’s value. Board of directors 
are responsible to discipline the management of an organisation so as to improve 
organisation value. Firm can use its board size to create environmental links to gain 
access to essential resources, this will be related with better firm performance 
(Alexander et al., 1993; Goodstein et al., 1994). Those boards with a larger size are 
recognized as showing variety in terms of their skills, backgrounds, and expertise 
that can provide high levels of performance (Brown et al., 2011). 
 
Directors independend played a major role in safeguarding governance high-quality 
and has been documented in all codes of corporate governance, and corporate rules 
that is recognised globally. Therefore, the assumption is made that the board is more 
independence if it has higher non-executive directors (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
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Byrd and Hickman (1992) have recognised greater response of firm stock market is 
related to larger percentage of non-executive directors. 
 
Better educational levels are recognized as assisting in the better management of 
firms and also with greater receptiveness to innovation, as highlighted by Kimberly 
and Evanisko (1981). The expertise of directors, such as accounting, consulting, 
financing and law, all support management in the making of decisions.   Wiersema 
and Bantel (1992) suggested that a greater level of education can be related with 
higher data-processing capability and the capacity to discriminate amongst alternate 
stimuli. 
 
Board independence from management is important for a board’s monitoring ability. 
Minton, Tailard & Williamson (2010) discovered that risk committee members 
independence decreases insiders risk taking activities resulting to a decline in losses 
specifically in financial crisis. Tao & Hutchinson, (2012) describe that, strategies 
will be put in place to protect the company and also there will be proper monitoring 
and control of risk taking activities if committee is made of up independence 
directors.  
 
The existence of a separate risk management committee is important for effective 
and transparent oversight function. There have been emphasis for separate risk 
management committee because of increase in the audit committee task by the 
regulatory bodies and lack of expertise and time essential to deliver supervision of 
the risk monitoring activities for the organisation (Yatim, 2009).  
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One of the advantages of having risk management committee in a company is to 
assess and manage any potentially catastrophic risks and operational risks. This has 
created a proper communication channel relating to risk assessment and avoidance 
whether horizontal or vertical. It provides guidelines and policies to govern the 
processes by which evaluation and supervision is handled by having an expert with 
experience in identifying, assessing and managing risk coverage oversight, and 
complicated organisational risk committee. This help to avoid any risk which have 
portent and undesirable efforts on the corporation’s performance. 
 
Murphy (2011) suggest that risk committee should be clearly separate from audit 
committees, as the former contain both prospective and retrospective dimension. The 
central bank of Nigeria (CBN) code of corporate governance 2014, each bank should 
have a Risk management framework identifying the governance structure, procedure, 
policies, and process for the monitoring, and control of the risk contain in its 
operations. One of the benefit of having risk management committee in a company 
is to evaluate and manage any potentially catastrophic risks and operational risks. 
 
Thus, this study will investigate the effect of board characteristics, and risk 
management committee attributes on the financial performance of listed banks in 
Nigeria. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
Therefore, from the issues highlighted in the problem statement section above, this 
research emphasizes on addressing the following questions that emerges within the 
study context: 
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1. What is the relationship between board size and financial performance of listed 
banks in Nigeria? 
2. What is the relationship between board independence and financial performance 
of listed banks in Nigeria? 
3. What is the relationship between board financial knowledge and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria? 
4. What is the relationship between risk management committee independence and 
financial performance of listed banks in Nigeria? 
5. What is the relationship between risk management committee size and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria? 
6. What is the relationship between the existence of separate risk management 
committee and financial performance of banks in Nigeria?  
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The focus of this research is to investigate the effect of board characteristics, and risk 
management committee attributes on the financial performance of listed banks in 
Nigeria. Precisely, the following objectives have been identified; 
1. To examine the relationship between board size and financial performance of 
listed Banks in Nigeria. 
2. To examine the relationship between board independence and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
3.  To examine the relationship between board financial knowledge and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
4. To examine the relationship between risk management committee independence 
and financial performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
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5. To examine the relationship between risk management committee size and 
financial performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
6. To examine the relationship between the existence of separate risk management 
committee and financial performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
 
 
1.5   Significant of the Study 
 
This study give board of directors the information which they will use in comparing 
the performance of their banks, with other banks. Managers will understand from 
this study on how current Nigerian codes of corporate governance will increase the 
performance in Nigerian banking sectors. This research will educate bank 
management the positive effect of corporate governance on financial performance 
banks. Student and readers would benefit from this research as it exposes and serves 
as reference material for further research, It will provides understanding the extent 
to which banks are complying with different section that of the codes of best practice 
and the area they face problems. The research would provide the structure which the 
government could take right policies on corporate governance and other code of best 
practice in order to move the economy forward to compete with their emerging Asian 
counterparts and the world in general. 
 
1.6. Scope and Limitations of the Study 
 
This study concentrates on the banks which are listed in the Nigerian stock exchange 
and the research cover the 15  banks that were listed and traded on main board of the 
Nigeria stock exchange from 2014 - 2016. The reason for choosing this sectors is 
because, stability in the banking sector is important and banks are vital institutions 
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that sustain the payment of an economy. The results of the study are limited to the 
banks operating within the Nigerian economy. The scope of board characteristics and 
risk management committee attributes involves of the board size, board 
independence board financial knowledge, risk management committee 
independence, risk management committee size and existence of separate risk 
management committee. With regards to bank financial performance, this study 
focused on one measurement of accounting performance, which is return on assets 
(ROA) used in this research to ascertain the financial performance of banks in 
Nigeria. 
  
   1.7 Summary of the chapter  
 
This chapter is an introductory aspect of this study. It started with discussing 
financial scandals and the recent corporate failure across the globe that has affected 
many companies and shows the importance of having a sound and good corporate 
governance regulation. The chapter highlight the importance of setting a separate risk 
management committee as it will help in monitoring risk activities for the 
organisation.  The chapter has various sections that encompass the background of the 
study, the main aims of the study as well as the research objectives at a glance, which 
the study seeks to address in solving existing problems, and the contribution of the 
study in creating an understanding of a country’s regulator on the role of the board 
of directors and risk management committee. The last aspect of this chapter gives an 
overview of the outline of the thesis. 
 
The research consists of five chapters. Chapter one, start with the introduction, the 
study background, followed by problem statement, then research questions and the 
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research objectives. The chapter also highlights the significance, scope, and 
limitation of the study. Chapter 2 concentrates on the review from prior literatures 
that is related to the independent and dependent variables. Also covers literature on 
the concept of corporate governance, corporate governance principle and 
compliance, importance of corporate governance in Nigeria, concept of bank 
financial performance, corporate governance structure, and theoretical framework 
and finally review of empirical literature. 
 
Chapter 3 explains about research methodology in the research. In this chapter, the 
population as well as sample of the study is discussed and, data collection and the 
instrument development for the study are highlighted, Methods employ for the data 
analysis to test the hypotheses development are also covered in this chapter. Chapter 
4 discusses descriptive statistics followed by diagnostic tests, correlation analysis, 
model selection between fixed effect, random effect and pool OLS. It then discusses 
the result from the linear regression analysis. Chapter 5 discusses the conclusion of 
the study, it goes further to discuss the implication of the study, limitations of the 
study, and recommendations for future studies. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Literature Review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the work of other scholars on corporate governance and the 
findings of prior studies. It contains a comprehensive discussion on corporate 
governance concept with a view to identify the corporate governance evolution in 
Nigeria, the importance of corporate governance, the principle and compliance of 
corporate governance, corporate  governance code of best practices for banks post 
consolidation, corporate governance legislation: an overview of Nigerian banking 
industry, corporate governance and bank distress, causes of corporate governance 
and bank distress in Nigeria and concept of bank financial performance will be 
discussed. Finally this section will identified and also discussed the theoretical 
framework of the study. 
 
2.2. Concept of corporate governance 
Corporate governance is multidimensional. Lacking a single theory, its explanations 
is found in the field of accountancy, economics, finance, and others (Olannye & 
David, 2014). Corporate governance is among the important factors which determine 
organisation financial strength and the capacity to survive economic shocks. 
Fundamental accuracy of Individual components and the connections between them 
help in building the strength of an organisation. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain 
the important factors that sustain country’s financial system the stability which 
include: effective marketing discipline; financial reporting system accuracy and 
reliability; good corporate governance; solid prudential regulation and supervision; 
disclosure regimes that is sound and suitable savings deposit system. 
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Corporate governance rotate around some important aspect such as board of directors 
responsibility, board of directors structure, their remuneration, director ownership, 
functions of services of institutional directors, enterprise freedom availability, 
accountability of member of board of directors, financial reporting, 
institutionalization of audit functions and linkage with shareholders. Sound corporate 
governance will enhance value by enabling best corporate management which will 
benefit shareholders (Rehmans & Mangla, 2010). 
 
Various scholars and practitioners define corporate governance. Although they all 
have same conclusion, so leading a consensus in the definition. Coleman and 
Nicholas-Biekpe (2006) defined corporate governance as the association between the 
shareholders and enterprise or the relationship of the enterprise to society in general. 
However, Mayer (1999) gives a broader definition that means the processes, 
information, and structures used for monitoring and control of organization 
management 
 
According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
corporate governance is a system that direct and control business. Governance 
structure stipulates the distribution of rights and responsibilities between the various 
members in the organisation, such as shareholders, managers, and other stakeholders, 
and explain decision making rules and procedures concerning company affairs. 
 
Nevertheless, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Vives (2000) discover a wider 
approach which interpret the subject as the methods through which managers are 
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control by finance providers so that their capital cannot be expropriated and to earn 
a return on their investment. However there is agreement that broader view of 
corporate governance should be accepted regarding banking institutions because of 
its nature which required that corporate governance mechanisms for banks should 
encapsulate depositors and shareholders (Macey & O‟Hara, 2001). 
 
2.3   Evolution of corporate governance in Nigeria  
Corporate governance developed after the study of corporate control and ownership 
separation, they recognise components of corporate governance importance. The 
divergence increases and performance diminishes when the degree of separation 
between ownership and control increases (El-Chaarani, 2014). “Without showing 
suspiciously nationalistic, corrupt practices in Nigeria is generally popular, it has 
deeply eaten into the societal structures of the Nigerian people”. The term corporate 
governance, is absolutely new subject of discussion in Nigeria. 
 
Nigeria has a change of power in the year 1999 which resulted to new administration 
into power with the aim of adopting a strategy to pull in new and feasible foreign 
investment which are needed for reform in all sectors of the economy. In Nigeria a 
commission was set up to study the adequacy, and importance of corporate 
governance in relation to the global best practices (Oyebode, 2009). 
 
In Nigeria regulatory agencies such as Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), and 
corporate affairs commission (CAC) self-intrigued executives are largely staffed 
who easily team up with senior officials within the organisation to trade off the 
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interest of the shareholders. High profile civil servant and retired military officers 
are chosen as board members without having the needed skills in business and 
financial dealings (Okpara, 2010). This saboteurs sits on the board of directors 
(average 40-50 members) to propagate fraudulent activities mostly changing the 
compensations of senior executives that compromise corporate governance decorum 
and etiquette. In Nigeria Institutional investors are left out in governance, and 
sometimes the annual general meetings gatherings even occur at remote areas trying 
to keep away most shareholders from attending (Oyebode, 2009). 
 
2.4.    The Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance 
week corporate governance and its improper implementation by the security and 
exchange commission (SEC) is among the main causes of corporate failure in Nigeria 
and lack of issuing several corporate governance code which will control and monitor 
the behavior of management and its board members (Idemudia, 2011; Adegbite et al, 
2012). 
 
It is the responsibility of the commission for issuing and revealing any weaknesses 
with regards to corporate governance code 2003 and 2008 and arrive at revised codes 
of corporate governance 2011 which is assumed will guarantee uppermost ethics of 
good governance mechanism and which will increase transparency and 
accountability in operations of corporations in Nigeria. The code was developed 
particularly to be applied by the public limited companies; however, the board of the 
commission security and exchange commission (SEC) has included all other 
business venture such as private corporations, small and medium industries to 
implement the new set standards and ethics. The board committee members have to 
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determines the degree to which its obligation, function besides the duty they should 
carried out as set in commission code via it’s’ committees. The board could, 
notwithstanding have an audit committee as suggested by Companies and Allied 
Matters Act (CAMA 1990), similarly they can constitute risk management 
committees, governance/compensation committee, and other suggested committees 
that would enhance the entity’s value depend on the sitting of the organisations 
(Adegbite & Nakajima, 2011). 
 
2.5. Importance of corporate governance in Nigeria 
The corporate scandals that happens in 2007 during the world financial crisis 
prompted the failure of corporate titans such as Enron, WorldCom, and so forth, has 
shown out the important of effective corporate governance all over the globe. In 
Nigeria careless stance of boards of directors and lapses among the senior executives 
of organisation in the areas of ensuring satisfactory evaluation of the frameworks for 
consistence with rules and regulations, combined with absence of frameworks to 
support and review material changes in accounting standards, keep on putting 
corporate governance in the bleeding edge as panacea for reversal (Adams & 
Mehran, 2003). 
 
Alfiero and Venuti (2015) discuss that majority of the literature examining the 
significance and role of corporate governance focus mainly on industries not on the 
banking industry or financial services sectors. Only recently banking sectors has been 
given attention. Alfiero and Venuti (2015) states that the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) defined “corporate governance” for banks in the 
glossary of its 2014 document “Corporate Governance Principles for Banks” as the 
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“set of relationships between a company’s management, board, shareholders and 
other stakeholders which gives the structure by which the objectives of the company 
are set, and the process of reaching those objectives and monitoring performance. It 
assist in defining the way authority is allocated and how corporate decisions are 
made”. 
 
With regards to the current world economic problems, corporate governance present 
study have clearly indicate a positive relationship between efficiency in best 
corporate governance practice and sustainable economic growth and development 
(Adams & Mehran, 2003).  
 
Okpanachi (2011) discuss that the implementation of the treasury single account in 
Nigeria poses a problem for Nigerian banks as states and other government 
parastatals that would normally fix deposit huge sums of money at once, no longer 
can as this money has to be rendered to the federal government for payment into the 
nation’s general treasury single account. The banks would previously use this fixed 
deposited money to grant loans and engage in other financial transactions while 
generating interest for itself. 
 
As the banks no longer have this source of capital at hand, their capital base drops 
and this poses a major challenge to the banks. Banks will no longer have access to 
float provided by the accounts they maintained for the ministries, departments and 
agencies. 
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The global economy was thrown in to deficit because, government across the globe 
are obligated to pay agency cost (monitoring and disciplining). Though, from 
literature review it shows that irrespective of the level of economic development of 
the western world, In Nigerian banking sectors the fundamental and the pragmatic 
common sense principles of corporate governance still continue to be vital. 
 
2.6. Corporate governance principle and compliance 
Expanding the quantity and quality of universal inflow of capital is a key significance 
step as an emerging nation. The recent financial crisis, which eventually started to 
have an influence during the third quarter of 2008, while slowing the world 
economies, by putting the United States of America into stagnation, this brought 
about the prominence practices of corporate governance to the attention of firms, and 
other stakeholders. A good corporate governance practices is a significant tool for 
indicators of growth and sustainability within the activities of the organizations in 
2011 (Mallin, 2012). 
 
Financial institutions are descriptive of the corporate approach within the financial 
sector and where it works, knows that a strong system for good governance can be 
achieved by deciding the kind of strategy the management will adopt, actualizing 
viable internal control and risk management instruments, setting efficient ethical 
tenets, running overall public disclosure under the range of the current disclosure 
guidelines in a superb manner (Adenike & Ayorinde, 2009). 
 
Financial institution  in conformity with the corporate governance standards, deals 
with the rights and obligations of its shareholders, employees, clients, and other 
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related parties by using the general principles of transparency, accountability,  
responsibility and accountability and equity involved within the point of view of 
efficient management and control system. Performing activities in line with the moral 
qualities decided in parallel with the Nigeria Commercial Code, Capital Markets Law 
and related enactment, financial institution is in consistence with the Corporate 
Governance Principles and regards them as important as financial performance for 
offering long term value for its potential investors (Nigerian Stock Exchange, 2009). 
 
 2.7. Concept of bank financial performance 
The composition of financial ratios, benchmarking, and performance measurement 
against target are been used mostly in measuring the banks financial performance 
and other financial institution (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & Lafond, 2009). 
The publish financial statement of banks normally disclose many financial ratios 
meant to provide banks performance indication.  
 
There are constraints in accounting related to choosing some of the financial ratios. 
This research notwithstanding, ROA ratios is utilized to measure the financial 
performance of commercial banks. Furthermore, return on assets (ROA) permits 
analyst and all stakeholders a means to evaluate the performance and corporate 
governance system of an organisations in securing and motivating efficient 
governance of the corporation. One of the purposes of establishing a corporation is 
to generate profit for all stakeholders’ (Epps & Cereola, 2008). As such the 
stakeholder may be interest in firms’ that are performing better looking at operating 
activities and return on each individual asset. 
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Simply expressed, the existing bank performance literature portrays the aim of 
financial establishments as that of acquiring satisfactory returns and reducing the risk 
consider to procure the return (Bhagat & Black, 2000).Klein (1998) applied return 
on assets (ROA) as an indicator of measuring performance. We can measure firms’ 
performance through the ROA proportion which shows the amounts of income have 
produced from assets or capital invested (Epps & Cereola, 2008). 
 
Risk and return has a commonly established relationship, in other words the more 
the risk the greater the projected return. Consequently, both risks and returns have 
been measured by traditional methods of measuring bank performance. The growing 
rivalry in domestic and global banking industry, the developments concerning 
monetary unions and the new technological developments show significant 
revolutions in the banking environment, and task all banks to prepare suitable 
arrangements so as to go into new competitive financial environment.   
 
Quadri (2010) in his study show that most past studies relating to organization 
performance assessment concentrate just on operational effectiveness and 
operational efficiency which may notwithstanding impact organisation existence. By 
utilizing advanced two stage data envelopment analysis model in their research, the 
empirical outcome of this study show that an organization with good effectiveness 
does not generally imply it has better efficiency. In Nigerian banking sector, financial 
statements of banks can be measured by a collection of financial ratios prepare to 
present a genuine picture of company's performance. 
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The reason why this study focus on financial performance is because information 
disclose in the annual report of banks are based on the facts and accountability that 
was used to improved and heightened project support for the executive strategy, 
better services and satisfaction are being provided to a customer. 
 
2.8 Corporate Governance Structure 
2.8.1 Board Size 
Board size has a role in influencing the firm’s value. Board of directors should 
contain both executive and non-executive directors. The chairman should be giving 
command to executive and non-executive directors. It is the responsibility of the 
board to control the management and the CEO of organisation to enhance the value 
of the firm. 
 
Prior research on board size show the association between bank performance and 
board size because  they have the capability to support make good decisions, which 
is difficult for CEO to control. Mak and Li (2001) explain there is positive association 
concerning board size and bank financial performance based on their ordinary least 
squares (OLS) outcome but  their two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions do not 
accept this outcome in investigating 147 Singaporean banks using data of 1995. 
Adams and Mehran (2003), discover a positive association between the board size 
and performance of United States banking sector. However, Dalton and Dalton 
(2005) explain that larger boards and bank performance were related. 
 
The size of the board impacts its overall capacity to operate efficiently, usually with 
smaller boards are seen to be less efficient in terms of gaining fundamental sources, 
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such as external funding, their budget amount, and leverage from an environment, as 
highlighted by (Alexander, Fennell & Halpern 1993). This opinion falls in line with 
the report by Birnbaum (1984), in which that environmental uncertainty (volatility 
and a shortage of information) can result in a larger board size. In such an instance, 
the size of the board could prove to be a measure of the capacity of a firm to get 
environmental links to gain access to critical resources. 
 
Those boards with a larger size are recognized as having different backgrounds, skills 
and expertise, which can give a greater abundance of ideas that can provide high 
levels of performance (Brown et al, 2011). Pearce and Zahra (1992), explain that 
bigger boards offer advice and guidance concerning strategic options to firm. Also, 
boards of a larger size have a greater capacity to overcome problems, especially in 
larger firms. The capability of the board to perform successful monitoring increases 
with the addition of more expert directors, all these can contribute in terms of offering 
efficiency in their supervisory duties. Representing shareholders’ interests is 
enhanced with a larger board, as recognized by Dalton et al. (1999). Reviewing 
management’s actions and the ability to do so will be improved with a larger board 
(Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). The meta-analysis of Dalton et al. (1999) is seen to 
support the view that board size can be related positively with firm performance. 
 
Many recent studies on the other hand supported boards that are smaller. Yermack 
(1996) discover a negative association between board size and financial performance 
of banks. A sample of 452 for large United State corporations were used between 
1984 and 1991, he stated that banks with greater market values is related to smaller 
boards. Also an inverse relationship was found by Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
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(1998) between size of the board and profitability. Vafeas (2000) also explain that 
banks with smaller boards are knowledgeable about profitability. 
  
Mak & Li (2001) stated that listed banks with smallest boards in Singapore and 
Malaysia have a tendency to have greater bank valuations. Bonn, Yoshikawa and 
Phan (2004) conducted their study among Japanese banks, and discover positive 
relationship between board size and bank financial performance. Shakir (2008) found 
negative relationship between board size and bank performance and is accordance 
with recommendation by Jensen (1993) who stated that having a reasonable smaller 
board of directors will help bank be effective in its monitoring. Haniffa   and Hudaib 
(2006) suggested there will be no effective monitoring of performance with a large 
board and could cost the organisation regarding compensation and incentive 
increased. 
 
Deciding the ideal number of directors is a key question to answer for companies. 
Efficiency is reduce if the number of directors is too large because decisions are 
difficult to make. Conversely, decision-making accuracy is reduced, if the number 
of directors is too small as there may not be enough discussion of issues involved 
(Wu, Xu, & Phan, 2011).  
 
In the United States of America the median size of the board was 12 Yermack (1996), 
Pfeffer (1972) argued that the choice for the size of the board are linked to the 
resource dependence viewpoint. The more the dependence on external environment 
is, the higher the board of directors. When directors serve mostly as administrators 
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smaller boards are more suitable. It should be known that smaller boards are more 
"manageable" from the CEO's view (Daily & Dalton, 1993). 
 
2.8.2. Board Independence 
Director independence is one of the important aspect of good CG because, this 
enables the board in properly meeting its obligation to supervise management and to 
safeguard the shareholders’ interests and other parties. The board of directors is 
normally composed of executive directors and non-executive directors: the former 
include management and CEOs who assume the role of directors on a full-time and 
management on a part-time; the latter, on the other hand, are independent directors 
and non-independent directors, none of whom are full-time directors. 
 
The independence of non-executive directors is fundamental if they are to be efficient 
overseers (Block, 1999; Brown et al, 2011). Independent directors do not have 
relationship with the business and management of the company, they have no link 
with any other directors. As such, independent directors need to be independent from 
a controlling shareholder and from management. Importantly, directors with a lack 
of management-centered independence will have problems in exercising 
independent judgment, which eventually puts shareholders interest at risk (Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1988). 
 
Board independence and the extent of such is directly linked with its overall 
composition. Therefore, the assumption is made that with a higher number of 
independent non-executive directors board becomes more independent (Hillman & 
26 
 
Dalziel, 2003). Nevertheless, there are varied findings concerning the link between 
board independence and firm performance. 
 
A number of empirical research indicated a strong positive link between board 
independence and firm performance. Zainal Abidin et al. (2009) recognize that a 
larger number of independent non-executive directors on the board has a positive 
effect in terms of the performance of the firm. Amran and Che-Ahmad (2009; 2010) 
find that board independence has a strong association with firm value. This is 
believed to be owing to the fact that independent directors tend to show greater 
diversity in terms of their characteristics, attributes, expertise and background and, 
which could improve the decision making and processes of the board, as well as firm 
performance.  Uadiale (2010) also recognise that strong positive link exist between 
board independence and firm performance. From the perspective of the USA, Byrd 
and Hickman (1992) have recognised that, the greater the number of non-executive 
directors, the greater the reaction of the stock market to the firm’s tenders offers for 
other firms. 
 
However, other studies indicate an insignificant and negative link with firm 
performance, such as that conducted by Abdullah (2004), who established that the 
independence of board members has an insignificant link with any of the measures 
of performance, also further supported by other academics in the field such as Amran 
(2010); Finegold et al. (2007); Lang, Lins and Miller (2004); Rashid et al. (2010) 
whom all recognised a negative value with ROA. Yermack (1996) identified a 
negative link between the percentage of independent directors on the board and 
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Tobin’s Q. Nevertheless, their findings are not necessarily the same as the case of 
performance measures. 
 
In the context of Thailand, a research was conducted by Yammeesri and Herath 
(2010), which suggest that independent directors are not significant element 
regarding enhancing the value of the firm. This view is supported further in the work 
of Ponnu & Karthigeyan (2010) in the context of Malaysia, which suggested that 
there is a lack of convincing support for the belief that external directors positively 
impact business performance. In the case of the Philippines, Ferrer et al. (2012) 
sought to establish the impact associated with board independence on firm 
performance, with a sample utilized comprising 29 publicly-listed property 
companies based in the Philippines 
 
Some believe that non-executive independent directors are under the power of the 
owner-manager, meaning there is the keen presence of political pressure. Moreover, 
the societal and cultural nature along with the appointment of member in board of 
directors is influenced through discrimination and prejudice, which is recognized as 
playing a notable role when choosing members. Such behaviour is recognized to 
have impact on the independence of the board, which could result in increased 
company-oriented risks (Al-Ghamdi, 2012; Chahine & Tohme, 2009). 
 
2.8.3. Board Financial Knowledge 
Better educational levels are recognized as assisting in the better management of 
firms and also with greater receptiveness to innovation, as highlighted by Kimberly 
and Evanisko (1981). It is believed that individual education has relationship with 
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conflict over money, and strategic vision and management control, where those who 
have achieved a greater level of education are recognized as having a good grasp of 
fiscal issues more so than those who have not sought educational attainment. 
 
Kesner (1988) recognised that the majority of directors’ occupations are business 
executives, with consultants, lawyers and school professors following. The directors’ 
expertise, such as accounting, financing, consulting, and law, all support 
management in decision making. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) suggested that a 
greater level of education can be related with higher data-processing capability and 
the capacity to discriminate amongst alternate stimuli. Markedly, Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) establish a relationship between director knowledge and board capital; 
this is seen to involve both social and human capital: the former refers to the implicit 
and tangible set of resources available through social relationships; the latter refers 
to the individual abilities, skills and knowledge of directors, and encompasses the 
basic functional, board-specific and business-specific abilities, knowledge and skills 
of directors. 
 
The board of directors gains knowledge and insight, which is recognized as having 
the potential to improve the quality of activities carried out. Gottesman and Morey 
(2006) state that educational qualification may be a proxy for intelligence, where 
more intelligent managers are expected to be better than their peers. Top managers 
of the firm are hired probably because of their superior ability. Bhagat et al. (2010), 
such ability consists of observable characteristics (e.g. educational backgrounds and 
work experiences). However, Cheng et al. (2010) show that the university degree 
held by the board chairman is positively associated with seven measures of 
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performance, namely earnings per share (EPS), ROA, cumulative returns, 
cumulative abnormal returns, growth in EPS, growth in ROA, and the market-to-
book ratio.  
 
Arifina, and Tazilahb (2016) Directors with accounting, finance, economics and 
business education background are also an important person to be appointed as part 
of board members. Their presence will help the companies to ensure financial matter 
being managed effectively and efficiently. 
 
2.9. Risk Management Committee attributes 
2.9.1. RMC Independence 
Board independence from management is important for a board’s monitoring ability. 
The presence of large number of non-executive directors sitting on the board is 
recognised as a good pointer of the independence of the board from management. 
Prior research (Dalton et al., 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1996) shows that boards 
cannot enquire and resist the power of the executive management if they are not 
sufficiently independence from management. The responsibility of independent 
executive directors is to control the manger’s behaviour that are related to risk taking 
activities. Thus, it is argue that non-executive care more about their status, so they 
will demand higher quality governance than executive directors. Uzun et, al (2004) 
states that organisation with a greater number of non-executive directors have good 
governance and fewer fraud accusations. 
 
According to fama and Jensen, (1983) RMC independence means the number of 
independent non-executive directors’ members sitting on the RMC. Subramaniam,  
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McManus, and Zhang (2009) stated that boards with higher number of non-executive 
directors are able vigorously investigate  about risks, and they see the setting up of a 
risk management committee as a vital means of support to assist them achieve their 
risk management oversight function compare to those with a small number of non-
executive director. Tao and Hutchinson, (2012) explain, when a committee is 
comprise of independent directors they will be able to monitor and control 
management risk taking activities and ensure all the strategies are working.  
 
However. Minton, Tailard and Williamson (2010) discover that independence of risk 
committee members’ reduces insiders risk taking activities resulting to reduction in 
losses particularly in financial crisis. In Nigeria the CBN 2014 code of corporate 
governance states that the risk management committee board composition shall 
contain at least two non-executive directors and the executive director in control of 
the risk management, however it has to be chaired by a non-executive director. 
 
2.9.2. RMC Size 
Risk management committee existence may be related with board size. The existence 
of large board size gives more opportunities to discover directors with needed 
expertise to organise and be incharge in a sub-committee dedicated to risk 
management. Risk management committee size means number of members sitting 
on the risk management committee (Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005). 
 
Adams and Mehran (2003) states that board of directors of banks are important to 
corporate governance activities. The boards of directors set up monitoring 
committees that mitigate the cost related with larger boards (Upadhyay, Bhargava & 
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Faircloth, 2014).thus, larger boards have been associated with both improved 
performance (Adams & Mehran, 2005), and greater bank risk taking (IMF, 2014). 
Consistent with prior studies (Beltratti & Stulz, 2012; Peni & Vähämaa, 2012) 
examination of a sample of financial institutions indicated that firms with 
shareholder-focused boards are associated with greater levels of systemic risk or 
lower returns 
 
A board primary responsibility is to deliver an effective monitoring function 
(Fleischer, Hazard & Klipper, 1988). According to Bédard et al. (2004) a big 
committee offer strength, expertise and diversity of view which is effective in terms 
of resolving potentials problems. Risk oversight arrangement seek to mitigate 
structural features that can hamper external shareholders’ ability to monitor banks 
effectively, given the complexity and opaqueness of their activities (de Andres & 
Vallelado, 2008). Banks boards of directors play a key role in overseeing risk 
controls to mitigate misconduct in financial institutions (Nguyen, Hagendorff & 
Eshraghi 2015a). Precisely, they report reduced bank misconduct levels when 
monitoring quality is high.  
 
2.9.3. Separate RMC 
Risk management in recent years have receive attention and it is clear that there is 
the need to exist for a strong framework to effectively identify, and manage risk 
(Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of Treadway Commissions 2004). There 
have been emphasis for the requirement for separate risk management committee as 
a result of growth in responsibilities imposed by the regulatory agencies on the audit 
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committee and lack of time and skills essential to give supervision of the firm risk 
monitoring activities (Yatim, 2009). 
 
Existence of a separate risk management committee is important for effective and 
transparent oversight function. The major objective of setting a separate risk 
management committee is to reduce the work on the audit committee and ensure the 
risk profile of the company is identified, monitored and controlled well. Murphy 
(2011) suggest that risk committee should be clearly separate from audit committees, 
as the former contain both prospective and retrospective dimension. Also supported 
by De Lacy (2005) that there should be separation between risk management 
committee and audit committee, particularly for complex business industries, where 
the committee should involve various levels of people, qualifications and 
experiences. The complexity of risks associated with complex businesses expose 
them to failure (Jarvis, 2005). Though, some argue that audit committees focus 
backwards on historical accounting policy rather than looking forward at risk 
oversight (McCormick, 2014). 
 
Freedman and Jaggi, (1982) discuss that the establishment of risk management 
committee, separate from the audit committee, offers a sound premise for significant 
business-wide risk management. The objective of the risk management committee 
(RMC) is to recognize and distinguish the majority of the risks confronting the 
company. . Furthermore, RMC aids the board in regulating the company’s risks and 
limit the function of audit committee related to corporation risk (Ford et al., 1999). 
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For risk management committee to be active in discharging its responsibilities, an 
arrangement of risk governance ought to be set up. Risk governance alludes to the 
structural in which risk is overseen by an organization. It characterizes what risks 
are, and who is in charge. As expressed in the risk governance direction announced 
by the Singapore Corporate Governance Council, "a healthy risk governance takes 
into account the expression of how, in the connection of its risks, an organization 
can: Attain its business targets; Plan its esteem recommendation; Analyze its risk 
tolerance; and Configure its procedures concerning the sensible desires of 
stakeholders’ alignment” (Ford et al., 1999). 
 
In Nigeria the establishment of a distinct or separate risk management committee is 
not mandatory, however, there shall be a risk management framework in every bank 
specifying the policies, and processes for the measurement, and control of the risk 
in-built in its operation CBN Code of Corporate Governance (2014). Also the code 
stated that the risk management policies shall reveal the bank’s risk profile and show 
obviously all the elements of the risk management as well as its internal control 
system. 
 
2.9. Theoretical Framework 
From the review corporate governance has been seen from different theoretical 
perceptions. The development of agency theory, Stewardship theory, stakeholder 
theory, and political theory, deal with the cause and effect of variables, such as the 
structure of board members, independent directors, audit committee, and top 
management function. Therefore, it can be claimed that corporate governance is like 
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a social relationship orther than process orientated structure. Based on this, the study 
will adopt agency theory as the theoretical framework. 
 
2.9.1. Agency Theory 
Economic theory is the root of agency theory and is widely used in corporate 
governance studies. Agency theory is defined as the “relationship between the 
principals, such as shareholders and agents such as the company executives and 
managers”. Based on this theory, shareholders as the principals of the organisation, 
employs the agents to work for them. Principals assign the running of business to the 
managers, who are the agent of the shareholders (Clarke, Cull, Peria, & Sánchez, 
2005). 
 
In agency theory the agent are expect to serve and make decision in the interest of 
shareholders. Though, the agent may not make decisions in the best interests of the 
principals (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Adam smith in the 18th century 
first highlighted such problem and later study by Ross (1973), and the comprehensive 
explanation of agency theory was offered first by (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kajola, 
2008). Actually, the idea of problems resulting from the separation of ownership and 
control has been established in agency theory by (Davis et al., 1997).  
 
In agency theory the agent may be succumbed to self-interest, opportunistic 
behaviour and decreasing short of congruence among the principal objectives and 
the agents pursuits. Though understanding of risk varies in its approach. Even though 
with such obstacles, separation of ownership and control was mostly presented by 
agency (Sullivan, 2002). Uadiale (2010) explain that rather than providing 
35 
 
fluctuating incentive payments, the agents will only pay attention on projects having 
more return and have a fixed wage without any incentive component. 
 
Even though reasonable assessment will be given, but corporate misconduct is not 
remove or even reduce. Where principal made rule control the agents the positivist 
approach is used, with the objective of increasing value of the shareholder. So, in 
this theory a more individualistic opinion is applied (Clarke et al, 2005). Agency 
theory can be used to discover the connection among the ownership and management 
structure.  
 
In agency theory the model of an employee is more of a self-interested, 
individualistic and are bounded rationally where punishments rewards and seem to 
take priority (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kajola, 2008). This theory recommends that 
employees are accountable in their responsibilities. 
  
2.10. Review of Empirical Study 
Al-Manaseer, Al-Hindawi, Al-Dahiyat, and Sartawi (2012) conducted a research on 
the effect of corporate governance on Jordanian Banks performance, the study 
investigate empirically the influence of corporate governance dimensions (board 
size, board composition, chief executive officer status, and foreign ownership) on 
Jordanian Banks performance. Pooled data, and ordinary least square estimation 
method was employed by the study to examine link between corporate governance 
dimensions and banks performance for 15 Jordanian banks listed on the Amman 
Stock Exchange.  A positive relationship was reveal by the study between corporate 
governance dimensions with the number of outside directors, foreign ownership and 
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Jordanian banks performance. Though, indicate a negative relationship between 
board size, the separation of the role of chairman and CEO with performance. It 
recommended banking regulation is importance in the field of corporate governance 
which would serve the interests of shareholders, board of directors, and executives.  
 
Rehmans and Mangla (2010), conducted a study on corporate governance and 
financial institution performance in Pakistan, by comparing Islamic, and 
conventional banks in Pakistan. This study provides the structure through which 
objectives of the company are established and the process of achieving those 
objectives and performance monitoring. It also explained how corporate governance 
will align the interest of investors and managers and ensure that organisation are 
govern for investors benefit. The study was mainly carried out on the basis of 
secondary information and literature survey, such as research papers, journals, article 
and newspaper. It found out that, Government authorities has influenced on the 
banking sector in Pakistan which lead to low performance in the sector. Important 
changes in the governance structure in each sector lead to a phenomenon 
development and high returns. The study found out that some gaps still exist in the 
governance structure for Pakistan banking sector, but these Islamic banks will fill 
those gaps because of their more dependable governance structure. 
 
Kim, Rasiah and Tasnim (2012) conducted a research on the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance of banks in Malaysia before and after the 
Asian financial crisis. The study show that following the Asian financial crisis, 
corporate governance is taking as a problem in banking system. The study ty to find 
and understand the differences among the two types of banking ownership i.e the 
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foreign owned banks  and the private domestic owned banks, with regards to 
relationship between corporate governance and bank performance before and after 
the Asian financial crisis.  
 
Suberu and Aremu, (2010), conducted a research on the merger activity and 
corporate governance in the Nigerian banking sector. Merger activity was examine 
by the study in the Nigerian banking sector which recorded twenty five (25) 
successful mergers acquired from regulatory demand for consolidation. Secondary 
data is used essentially. The main finding show that poor state of the Nigerian 
economy is partially cause by the banking industry, because of its support for the 
import dependence nature of the economy other than financing of sustainable 
economic development through maximization of shareholders values. It was 
suggested that to confirm developments in corporate governance through the pursuit 
of shareholder value which managers, should sustain as controlling instruments for 
their job security. 
 
Kajola (2008), examine corporate governance and performance of firms, using 
quoted Nigerian companies as a case study. The study try to investigate four 
corporate governance mechanism relationship (board composition, board size, chief 
executive status, and audit committee) and two firm performance measures (PM and 
ROE), twenty (20) Nigerian quoted companies were used as sample for the period 
between 2000 and 2006. OLS and Panel methodology were used by the study as a 
method of estimation, the outcome indicate ROE has a positive significant 
relationship with board size and chief executive status. Also the outcome show that 
PM has a positive significant relationship with Chief executive Status. The study 
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though, do not show any significant relationship between board composition and 
audit committee with the two performance measures.  
 
Kyereboah-Coleman, (2007), conducted research in Africa on corporate governance 
and firm performance by employing a dynamic panel data analysis. The study used 
both accounting based performance measures and market based performance 
measures to investigate the influence of corporate governance on the performance of 
companies in Africa. Unique data was derived from 103 quoted companies from 
Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, and Kenya, for five-year period 1997– 2001 was used 
and analysis done within the dynamic panel data framework. The outcome show that 
the extent and the direction of effect of governance are dependent on the performance 
measure being examined. Specifically, the result display that joining the positions of 
chairman of the board and CEO has a negative effect on corporate performance and 
independent and large boards increase the value of the company, and also discover 
that CEO’s tenure in office improves firm’s profitability, also board activity intensity 
influence profitability negatively.  Audit committee frequency meetings and their 
size have positive influence on market based performance measures and that 
institutional shareholding increases firm’s market valuation. It was recommended 
that the position of board chairman and CEO should be separated and also to maintain 
a reasonable independent audit committees. 
 
Lastly, Sanda, Mikailu and Garba (2005), in their study examine corporate 
governance mechanism and company financial performance in Nigeria. The study 
aimed at explaining the recent global events with regards to collapse of high profile 
companies. The research use documentary sources of data in it methodology and also 
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the study tries to address corporate governance mechanism. Pooled ordinary least 
squares regression and descriptive statistic were used to examine the relevant data 
collected. The study indicated that reasonable individual number and or corporate 
bodies are required with more than typical share of equity of the company as this will 
enable them to embark on monitoring process. 
 
2.10. Summary of the Study 
This chapter provides an overview of the literature regarding the effects of board size, 
board independence, board financial knowledge, risk management committee 
independence, risk management committee size, existence of separate risk management 
committee on bank financial performance as well as an overview of corporate 
governance and its regulation in Nigeria. The results of previous studies have shown 
that the effectiveness of the board and its committee members to monitor the 
management is associated with firm performance Existence of a separate risk 
management committee is important for effective and transparent oversight function. 
The major objective of setting a separate risk management committee is to reduce the 
work on the audit committee and ensure the risk profile of the company is identified, 
monitored and controlled well. 
Based on this literature, the following chapter research hypotheses are developed in the 
following chapter. In addition, research design and methodology for this study are 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The section discusses the framework of the methods used in carrying out the study. 
Therefore, the section is subdivided into the following heading; research design to 
be adopted, population of the study, sample size and sampling technique, sources of 
data and methods of data collection, study variables, methods to be use in analysing 
the data generate from the research instruments to be administer. The research used 
secondary data obtained from the annual report and data stream of fourteen (14) 
banks listed on the Nigerian stock exchange for the year 2014-2016 with 42 firm year 
observations. 
 
3.2. Research Framework 
Agency theory is used by the study to study the relationship between board 
characteristics, risk management committee attributes and financial performance. In 
agency theory, the major issues is discussed by the agency emerge under 
circumstances of insufficient information and asymmetric. Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) discover the agency theory organizes the association between board 
characteristics and firm performance. 
 
The owner and manager relationship is arrange by the agency theory, also promote 
segregation of responsibilities to reinforce confidence among owners and managers, 
also this will assist to enhance the performance of the company and improved the 
company value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Crucial dealings with board of directors 
agency problem is among the major devices that provides the supervision function 
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(Lefort & Urzúa, 2008). The board of directors is significant in protecting the 
shareholders’ interests from management self-interest. In Modern Corporation the 
solution to some agency issues rely on board of directors responsibilities (Adams, 
Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2008). 
 
The board major aim is to decrease agency costs, improve information disclosure 
that helps the stakeholders, and also work to strengthen the interest of shareholders 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Abdullah (2004), explain that the board can be improved by 
the establishment of the board, structure, and size, which can assist to enhance 
performance. Hypothetically, for company’s operations, the board has to bear all 
responsibilities, its financial feasibility and ensure is accordance with what the 
company need and shareholders’ interest and also, the board perform important 
function in influencing financial performance of the firm  (Coles, McWilliams, & 
Sen, 2001; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
The study tries to examine the link between the board characteristics involving board 
size, board independence, and board financial knowledge. And also risk management 
committee attributes comprising risk management committee independence, risk 
management committee size and existence of separate risk management committee, 
with financial performance (ROA) in Nigerian listed Banks. The independent 
variables are examined against the financial performance (ROA) which serve as the 
dependent variable. 
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Figure 3.1 shows the study research framework containing all variables. The 
discussion of each variable and also development of hypotheses is discuss in detail 
in the following paragraphs. 
 
 
 
Independent variables 
                     
 
 
                 
    
 
 
    Dependent Variables 
 
 
     
 
Control variables 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Research framework 
 
Board Characteristics: 
Board size 
Board independence 
Board financial knowledge 
 
 
 
 
Financial Performance (ROA) 
Firm size 
Bank age 
Leverage 
 
 
 
Risk Management Committee 
attributes: 
Risk management committee 
independence 
Risk management committee size 
Existence of separate risk 
management committee 
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3.3. Hypothesis Development 
The section provides the relationship between financial performances (ROA) as 
dependent variables with board characteristics, and risk management committee 
attributes namely, board size, board independence, board financial knowledge, risk 
management committee independence, risk management committee size and 
existence of separate risk management committee as independent variables. 
 
3.3.1 Financial Performance 
The study used financial performance as dependent variable, regarded, as return on 
asset (ROA) represent financial performance indicators. 
 
ROA is usually a strong measure of the profitability of the company. Each company 
has different ROA and indicate efficient utilization of asset .however, the operating 
and financial performance of the firm is evaluate by ROA. (Klapper & Love, 2003). 
Thus, greater ROA show the efficient utilization of assets for shareholders interest. 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006). 
 
Miller, Boehlje and Dobbins (2001), stated that ROA indicates a measure for 
evaluating the total effectiveness on how the asset of the firm are utilised. 
Furthermore, the authors explain that ROA is an indication of efficient control in 
distribution of capital, as there is a probability of the company being effective but 
not able to utilize capital. Corporate governance studies widely used ROA (for 
example Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Brown & Caylor, 2004; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; 
Kajola, 2008; Klapper & Love, 2004; Rechner & Dalton, 1991. In this study, 
concentration is given to independent variables such as board size, board 
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independence, board financial knowledge, risk management committee 
independence, risk management committee size and existence of separate risk 
management committee. 
 
3.3.2 Return on Asset  
ROA is the accounting based measurement and it shows the overall efficiency of 
assets utilization by the firm in terms of improving the wealth of shareholders. 
Various companies has different ROA representing measurements of efficient 
utilization of assets.  Miller (1995) explain that, ROA measures the efficient 
utilization of firm asset from firm operation. 
 
Therefore, ROA is defined as net income generated before interest expenses for the 
fiscal year divided by total assets for that same year. It measures the ability of bank 
management in investments of its assets, buildings and land, inventory and stocks. 
Higher ROA means the bank is more efficient and capable of using the funds (Wen, 
2010). The ROA also gauges the firm's performance in terms of its finance and 
operations (Klapper & Love, 2003). Therefore, the higher the ROA, the more 
effective is the utilization of assets to satisfy the shareholders' interests (Ibrahim & 
Samad, 2011). 
 
3.3.3 Board Size and Financial Performance 
Bigger boards are recognised to be able to control top management and also size of 
the board is normally believed to influence the monitoring strength (Abdullah, 2004). 
Also it shows that boards that are large result to difficulty in terms spending more on 
maintenance, also difficulties in, work organisation, planning, holding frequent 
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meetings, and making decision, because of having large members. While smaller 
board will solve the problem of individual free riding and enhanced their decision 
making. 
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) discuss that an increase in board size will result to less 
effective management supervision. Eight (8) or nine (9) members should be the board 
size as suggested by the author. Jensen (1993) give additional evidence by explaining 
when the number of board members increase from 7 0r 8 the board become less 
effective. Also, Jensen, (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recognised that higher 
boards are less active and there is a likelihood that conversation between the 
members become less important. Difficulties arise regarding coordinating and 
processing problems with a growth in board size. 
 
Some empirical research findings which support the arguments such as studies by 
(Adams et al., 2008; Bonn et al., 2004; Mak & Li, 2001; Vafeas, 2000; Yermack, 
1996); which indicate a negative relationship between board size and firm 
performance. Shakir (2008) also discover a negative relationship between board size 
and firm performance. On the opposite, (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Dalton & Dalton, 
2005; Mak & Li, 2001; Pfeffer, 1972; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) found a positive 
relationship between the two. Hence; 
H1: There is a negative relationship between board size and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
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3.3.4. Board Independence and Financial Performance 
Board independence improves good CG which increases firm performance. The 
presence of board independence shows that the board properly fulfils its legitimate 
obligation to supervise management also safeguard other parties’ interest such as 
shareholders. Importantly, shareholders interest is at risk if the board of directors 
cannot exercise independent judgment, (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). 
 
Based on the agency theory, board independence enables the restraining monitoring 
of self-interest pursuits, therefore helping to decrease opportunities for agency costs 
and fraud (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Accordingly, with greater percentage of 
independent non-executive directors, the board becomes more independent (Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003). 
 
Some empirical research have shown there exist a significant and positive link 
between board independence and firm performance. For example, Amran and Che 
Ahmad (2009; 2010); Cicero et al. (2010); Uadiale (2010); and Zainal Abidin et al. 
(2009) find a significant positive association between board independence with firm 
value.  Because it is believe that independent directors have a tendency to show 
greater diversity in terms of their, characteristics, expertise, and background, which 
could ultimately enhance the decision making and processes of the board, as well as 
firm performance. Board independence has a strong influence on stock market 
performance. Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) have 
recognised that the larger the number of non-executive directors, the greater the 
reaction of the stock market or stock prices to the firm’s tenders offers for other firms. 
Al-Abbas (2009) conducted a local study in which he recognizes a link between the 
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integrity of the financial accounting process and independent directors’ presence on 
the company board. 
H2: There is a positive relationship between board independence and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria.  
 
3.3.5 Board Financial Knowledge and financial performance 
Board members who reached a greater level of education are considered as having a 
better grasp of fiscal issues than those who do not have higher education. Since 
boards are charged with ensuring that the funds of shareholders are not misused, 
shareholders must make sure that the board members are both experienced and well-
educated. Directors’ competency and background are important elements as they 
positively contribute to companies’ values (Johannisson & Huse, 2000). 
 
The expertise of directors in areas such as accounting, financing, consulting, and law 
all help to aid management in making decisions. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) 
suggested that a greater level of education can be related with higher data-processing 
capability and the capacity to discriminate between alternate stimuli. Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003) linked director knowledge and human capital individual abilities, 
knowledge, and skills of directors that encompass the basic functional, board and 
business-specific abilities, knowledge and skills of directors. Chen et al. (2005) 
emphasized that intellectual capital adds significant value to firm profitability. 
Switzer and Huang (2007) who sampled mutual funds in Canada, established that the 
mutual funds’ performance can be related directly with aspects of managerial human 
capital. 
H3: There is a positive relationship between board financial knowledge and 
financial performance of listed banks in Nigeria.  
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3.3.6 RMC Independence and Financial Performance 
Individuals’ quality that serve on the RMC is a key sign for affective monitoring of 
risk matters. The committee efficiency is based on the composition of the committee. 
RMC is seen to be more effective when the composition of the committee members 
come from outside of the company or they are independent members because they 
have the incentive to protect their reputation as expert (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
 
Also, agency theory recommend that independent of committee members is one of 
the elements that have influence on the effectiveness of the committee (carson, 
2002). From the agency theory perspective independent risk management committee 
members will be able to monitor any self-interested behaviour by managers and 
lower agency cost (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Independence of the risk management 
committee members, will enable them to deal with any management pressure, and 
acquire the essential information for controlling risk of the companies which will 
improve supervision and control of the company’s risk and eventually improved firm 
performance (Yeh, Chung, & Liu, 2011). 
 
Empirical studies indicate that a relationship exist between risk management 
committee independence and firm performance. Pathon (2009) found a negative 
relationship between RMC members’ independence and risk in finance companies. 
The negative relation could be related to lack of supervision monitoring by 
independent executive director because of busy schedule or lack of experience 
required to carry out the supervision efficiently (Tao & Hutchinson, 2012)  Also a 
study conducted by Kallamu (2015) reported that risk management committee 
independence is significantly negatively linked with ROA.  
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Yeh et al. (2011) indicate that finance firm with large number of independent 
directors sitting on risk committee do well during financial crisis period better than 
those with small independent directors. However, Xie et al. (2003) explain that non-
executive board members tend to reduce the probability of a company being involve 
in accounting fraud. Also Wu, et al. (2016) found that the percentage of independent 
directors sitting on risk management committee are positively and significantly 
related with the effectiveness of Malaysian insurers. 
 
H4: There is a positive relationship between RMC independence and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
 
3.3.7. RMC Size 
Empirical studies indicated that committee size may have implication on 
performance of the company. Halim, Mustika, Sari, Anugerah, and Mohd-Sanusi 
(2017) explain that large board size is assumed to help the performance of the Board 
in implementing risk management and overseeing the performance of the agent, so 
that the agent does not trespass the authority that has been given by the principal. A 
larger board size will deliver greater chance to discover members with the required 
expertise to organise and be involved in the committees formed by the Board of 
Commissioners designated for risk management (Subramaniam et al., 2009). 
 
Tao and Hutchinson (2012), discuss that good performance is positively associated 
with existence of risk management committee. They discover that RMC size is 
important in handling the risk of finance companies and increasing their 
performance. This is further supported by Battaglia, and Gallo (2015) that risk 
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committee size and ROA has a positive relationship. They recommends that for the 
period 2007-2011, banks having a bigger risk committee achieve higher profitability. 
Also Wu, Kweh, Lu, & Azizan (2016) found that risk management committee 
characteristics including the number of directors sitting on the risk management 
committee are positively and significantly associated to the effectiveness of 
Malaysian insurers. 
 
Rao, and Jirra (2017) in their study shows a positive relationship between risk 
committee size and liquidity risk management in Commercial banks. The findings of 
this study indicated, Ethiopian commercial banks board of subcommittee, especially 
risk committee size play a pivotal role in effective supervision of the risk 
management in banking sector. Therefore, the banks should give due consideration 
to the size of risk committee in board room. 
H5: There is a negative relationship between RMC Size and financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria. 
 
3.3.8. Separate RMC 
As a result corporate failure and high profile business scandals where investors and 
other stakeholders suffered terrific loss, this has called the attention of authority and 
regulator to concentrate on corporate transparency that support for the establishment 
of boards in an organization that includes the establishment of Risk Management 
Committee to help the executive in checkmating the risk profile, the dimension of 
risk or risk structure.  
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Harrison (1987) stated that the existence of risk management committee as distinct 
board committees in charge with particular part of the board function allow the 
directors to focus on specific area and spend more time on their work. According to 
Halim et, al (2017) separate RMC result to better control of risk which decrease 
losses and increase performance. 
 
Previous literatures has used agency theory to examine the structure of the board 
committees (see Benz & Frey, 2007; Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve & Hu, 2006; 
Subramaniam et al., 2009). The board committees are expected to occur in a situation 
where agency cost is higher, such as in more complex companies, bigger companies 
and companies with higher financial leverage (Subramaniam et al., 2009). The 
argument is supported in an earlier study by Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 
(1997) that in terms of risk orientation, the agency theory is seen as a control 
mechanism whereby the RMC acts as the principal. In this study, the RMC and its 
composition, is seen as a principal and performs the oversight function over the 
management (agent) in terms of risk management. The RMC, as a board sub-
committee, acts on behalf of the shareholders (principal), to protect the shareholders' 
investment and reduce agency cost. 
 
Akindele (2012) states that firm’s performance mainly depends on the mechanism 
used in handling the risk. The failure of corporation or an entity could also be 
attributed to poor risk management mechanism (Davies, 2013). There also literatures 
that shows a positive association among Risk Management Committee and firm 
performance, for instance (Hoyt & Liebenberg, 2011; Rogers & Graham, 2002, 
Gordon, Loeb, & Tseng, 2009). Though, there are studies that indicates a negative 
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relationship between firm performance and risk management committee (Beasley et 
al, 2005). 
H6: There is a positive Relationship between Existence of Separate RMC and 
Financial Performance of Listed Banks in Nigeria 
 
3.4. Research Design 
 
Research design includes evaluation and collection of data. This is dictated by the 
research nature. It includes building up reliability and validity of the study. The main 
aim of the research design is to determine the relationship that occurs among the 
researches questions, the data collected and to draw conclusion (Asika, 2004). This 
study collect and utilize documentary source of data acquired from the annual reports 
and accounts of listed banks in Nigeria for the period under study. 
 
3.5. Population of the Study 
 
The study involves all banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. So, the study 
population covers all fifteen (15) commercial banks in accordance with the Central 
Bank of Nigeria regulation. 
 
3.5.1 Sample Size and Sampling Technique  
 
From population of the study, there are fifteen (15) banks listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange from 2014-2016 which are sampled out for the study, but only 14 banks 
has complete data which are: 
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Table 3.1. 
Listed Banks in Nigeria 
   No. Commercial Banks in Nigeria 
1 Access Bank Plc 
2 Diamond Bank Plc 
3 Ecobank Nigeria Plc 
4 Fidelity Bank 
5 First City Monument Bank Plc 
6 First Bank Of Nigeria Plc 
7 Guarantee Trust Bank Plc 
8 Sterling Bank Plc 
9 Stanbic-IBTC Bank Plc 
10 United Bank for Africa 
11 Unity Bank Plc 
12 Union Bank Plc 
13 Wema Bank Plc 
14 Zenith Bank Plc 
Source: Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) 2016 
 
It is observed that the banks that will make up the population are homogeneous, the 
patterns of preparing and reporting their financial statements in which findings can 
be generalized are almost similar. The 14 commercial banks are sufficient enough to 
be the representative of the entire population. 
 
3.6. Sources of Data and Methods of Data Collection  
 
The data that utilize for this study is secondary data acquired from the annual reports 
and data stream of listed banks in Nigeria. Even though accuracy of financial 
statements mostly rely on the integrity of the banks, and diligence exercised by 
different supervisory authorities, it is considered  that these statements are highly 
reliable because the data are going to be sourced from various avenues especially the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) publications like Annual Reports, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) publication. 
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3.7. Method of Data Analysis 
 
The data for this study is derived from one sources, i.e documentary sources, 
different statistical tests is carry out to examine the link between the Variables in the 
study. Multiple regression technique is used to correlate the relationship between 
dependent and independent variables. The regression model focused on Board size 
(BOADSIZE), Board independence (BOARDINDE), Board financial knowledge 
(BOARDFINKNOW), Risk management committee independence (RMCINDE), 
risk management committee size (RMCSIZE), existence of separate risk 
management committee (SRMC) and Return on Asset (ROA). 
 
 
 
3.7.1 Model Specification and Multiple Regressions  
 
Multiple regression method is used to study the relationship between the financial 
performance of listed banks in Nigeria and board size, board independence, board 
financial knowledge, RMC independence, RMC size, and separate RMC. 
 
The result from the regression analysis is an equation that indicate the prediction of 
a dependent variable from many independent variables. This method is employ when 
the independent variables are related with one another and with the dependent 
variable this method is used. 
The regression equation is estimated as follow: 
FP = α0 + β1 BOARDSIZE + β2 BOARDINDE + β3 BOARDFINKNOW + β4 
RMCINDE + β5 RMCS + β6 SRMC + β7 FIRMSIZE + β8 BANKAGE + β9 
LEVG + ε it  
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Where: 
FP = Financial Performance 
BOADSIZE = Board size 
BOARDINDE = Board independence 
BOARDFINKNOW = Board financial knowledge 
RMCINDE= Risk management committee independence 
RMCS = Risk management committee size 
SRMC = Separate risk management committees 
FIRMSIZE = Firm size 
BANKAGE = Bank age 
LEVG= Leverage 
ε it = Error term 
 
All dependent variables were entered into the regression equation concurrently to 
study the relationship among the entire set of predictors and the dependent variable. 
The goal for the analysis is to know the independent variables that are extremely 
significant in deciding financial performance of bank. 
 
3.7.2. Measurement of the Variables 
 
Dependent variables, independent variable, and control variable measurement is 
provided under this section. The will measure the variables as follows: 
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3.7.2.1. Dependent Variables 
 
One measure concerning financial performance that is used namely ROA in order to 
differentiate among the effect that board characteristics and risk management 
committee attributes have on the types of financial performance. Therefore, ROA is 
defined as net income generated before interest expenses divided by total assets for 
that same year (Garba & Abubakar 2014; Makki & Lodhi (2014)  
 
3.7.2.2. Independent Variables 
 
The section gives measurements of the board and risk management attributes as 
independent variables which are state as follows: 
 
Board size is important in influencing the firm value. The board of directors should 
be structured to comprise both executive and non-executive directors. The function 
of board of directors is to control the management and the CEO of an organisation,  
so that the value of the firm can be enhanced. Board size is measure as the total 
number of directors sitting on the board (Shukeri (2012); Garba & Abubakar (2014) 
 
Board independence is one of the important aspect of good CG because, this enables 
the board in properly fulfilling its legal obligation to supervise management and to 
protect shareholders interest and other stakeholders. Is define as the proportion of 
non-executive directors divided by total directors (Sanda et al., 2010; Davidson & 
Rowe 2004). 
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Board financial knowledge are recognized as assisting in the better management of 
firms and also with greater receptiveness to innovation, as highlighted by Kimberly 
and Evanisko (1981). The expertise of directors, such as accounting, consulting, 
financing and law, all support management in the making of decisions. It is defined 
as proportion of directors with educational background in accounting, finance, 
economics, and business administration divided by total directors (Dionne & Triki 
2005). 
 
Risk committee members independence decreases risk taking activities of 
management, this result to a reduction in losses particularly in financial crisis period 
(Minton, Tailard & Williamson 2010). Risk management committee independence 
is measure as the proportion of non-executive directors divided by total directors on 
the risk committee (Fama & Jensen 1983). 
 
Risk management committee existence may be linked with board size. The existence 
of large board size gives more opportunities to discover directors with needed 
expertise to organise the risk management. Risk management committee size is 
measure as the number of directors sitting on the risk management committee 
(Ballesta & Garcia-Meca, 2005). 
 
The existence of a separate risk management committee is important for effective 
and transparent oversight function. The major objective of establishing a separate 
risk management committee is to reduce audit committee work and enable the risk 
profile of the company is identified, monitored and controlled well. Is measure as a 
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dummy variable of “1” will be used if a firm sets up a risk management committee, 
and “0” if otherwise (Hoyt & Liebenberg 2011)  
 
3.7.2.3. Control Variables 
 
This section provides firm size, bank age, and leverage as the control variables. 
3.7.2.3.1. Firm Size 
 
Empirical literature of corporate governance used firm size as control variable in 
measuring the performance of the firm (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007; Alzharani et al., 
2011). This study use firm size as control variable because it is discover to be related 
to firm with different features. 
 
Firm size has influence on company performance. Empirical literature on corporate 
governance used it as a control variable, as in De Andres et al. (2005), Linck, Netter    
and Yang (2008) and (Ghosh, 2006). Though, firm size can have a strong influence 
on corporate performance. Large firms may be less active compare to smaller firms 
for the reason that they can meet the government bureaucracy, and more agency 
problems (Lehn et al., 2009). Though, there is a possibility to use economies of scale, 
more powerful on the market, and employ more skilled managers, large firms tend 
to be more effective (Kyereboah-Coleman & Biekpe, 2005). Also, Coles et al. (2001) 
argued that large board members are needed when firm is growing to assist in 
monitor the performance of managers. 
 
Finally, this study measure firm size by using the natural logarithm of total assets 
(Alhaji 2012; Kurawa & Kabara, 2014)  
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3.7.2.3.2. Bank Age 
 
Bank age is measure using number of years  bank incorporated. As organizations 
age, routines, systems, and standard operating procedures are consciously created or 
otherwise emerge (Blau & Scott, 1962). A number of empirical studies generally 
used bank age as a control variable which studied the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm's performance (Ahmed, Ahmed, & Ahmed, 2010; Anderson, 
Mansi, & Reeb, 2004).  
 
3.7.2.3.3. Leverage 
 
Leverage means the utilisation of funds borrowed in an effort to improve firm 
performance. Some empirical studies has used leverage widely as a control variable 
to study the association between corporate governance and financial performance for 
instance, Habbash, (2010); Adelopo, (2011) and Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 
(2006). These studies indicate that debt has an impact on company financial 
performance.  
 
Leverage is used as control variables because of it is important to control the chances 
of the spurious relationship among the variables (board size, board independence, 
board financial knowledge, risk management committee, and firm performance). 
Greater debt level can increase agency costs, and decreases managerial cost that 
could made to provide more level of disclosure in annual reports and enhances firm 
performance (Mangena & Pike, 2005). 
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Agency theory assumed that the level of the increase in leverage increases the 
efficiency of the board. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain that leverage must be 
use by the company to help control the costs such as debt levels rise to agency. 
Managers are able to offer more supervision in the most effective board. 
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Table 3.2. 
Summary of the Operationalization of Research Variables 
 
No Variables Acronym Operationalization Source 
1 Dependent 
variable: 
Return on 
Assets Ratio 
ROA net profit divided by 
total assets (NP/TA)  
 
Garba & 
Abubakar 
(2014); Makki 
& Lodhi 
(2014)  
 
 
 
1 
Independent 
Variable: 
Board size 
 
BOADSIZE 
 
Total number of 
directors sitting on 
the board of 
directors. 
 
Shukeri 
(2012); 
Eklund et al. 
(2009); Garba 
and Abubakar 
(2014)  
 
2 Board 
independence 
 
BOADINDE 
 
Proportion of  non-
executive directors 
divided by total 
directors 
 
Sanda et al, 
(2010); 
Davidson & 
Rowe (2004)  
 
 
3 Board 
financial 
knowledge 
 
BOADFINKNOW 
 
 
Proportion of 
directors with 
educational 
background in 
accounting, finance, 
economics, and 
business 
administration 
divided by total 
directors 
Dionne & 
Triki (2005) 
 
 
4 Risk 
management 
committee 
independence 
 
 
RMCINDE 
 
proportion of  non-
executive directors’ 
divided by total 
directors on the risk 
committee 
 
Fama & 
Jensen (1983). 
 
5 Risk 
management 
committee 
size 
 
 
RMCS 
 
Number of directors 
sitting on the risk 
management 
committee 
 
Ballesta & 
Garcia-Meca, 
(2005) 
 
6 Separate risk 
management 
committee 
 
SRMC A dummy variable of 
“1” used if a firm 
sets up a risk 
management 
Hoyt, & 
Liebenberg 
(2011 
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committee, and “0” if 
otherwise  
 
1 
Control 
variable: 
Firm Size 
 
FIRMSIZE 
 
 
 Natural log of total 
assets 
 
Alhaji (2012); 
Kurawa & 
Kabara (2014)  
 
2 Bank Age 
 
 
BANKAGE 
 
 
Number of years 
since the company 
start incorporation 
 
Alhaji, (2014); 
Faruq (2011). 
 
 
3 Leverage 
 
LEVG 
 
Total debts divided 
by total asset  
 
Huda & 
Abdullah 
(2013)  
 
 
 
 
3.8. Data Analysis 
 
Stata 14 software was used to analyse the data which includes of descriptive statistics 
gives details and summary to be collected from the annual statement of Nigerian 
banks. 
 
3.8.1. Descriptive Analysis 
 
Descriptive analysis was conducted to reduce the mean, minimum, maximum, and 
standard deviation for each variable of the sample selected in the study. 
 
3.8.2. Diagnostic Test Panel Data Analysis 
 
Normality, multicollinearity, heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation are the common 
diagnostic tests to be conducted before analysis and econometric modelling can be 
done (Carneiro, 2006). These four (4) tests were to be conducted in this study in order 
to prove that there is a high possibility that econometric assumptions are not violated 
and to obtain truthful results. 
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3.8.2.1. Normality Test 
 
Normality is defined as the shape of the distribution of data for individual 
quantitative data variable and its normal distribution. It is a basic assumption in 
multivariate analysis that follows the premise that a significant deviation from 
normality result to an invalid statistical outcome (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & 
Tatham, 2006). Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) explain that the distribution shape can 
be observed on a graph.. For the purpose of this study Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-
Francia, Mardia Skeness Henze-Zirkler and Kernel Density Estimator were to be use 
respectively. 
 
3.8.2.2. Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
Heteroscedasticity test of a group of variance is required in the panel data analysis 
because such analysis is the combination of cross sectional data and time series. 
There are many heteroscedasticity tests available, namely, Spearman’s Rank 
Correlation, Goldfeld-Quandt Test, the Breush-Pagan Goldfrey Test, Glejser Test, 
Park Test, and White Heteroscedasticity Test. Consequently, Gujarati and Porter 
(2009) observe that there is no answer for the best and most powerful test to diagnose 
the problem. Greene (2003) recommended using the White Heteroscedasticity Test. 
The Whites test itself has many alternatives and the choice of such a test depends on 
the statistical package used. In the panel data analysis using Stata statistical software, 
a modified Wald test for group wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals could measure 
heterogeneity from the significance of the chi-square value (Greene, 2003). 
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3.8.2.3. Autocorrelation Test 
 
Another diagnostic test that is relevant to the panel data analysis includes checking 
the correlation among the disturbance term of observations in time or space (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2009). In the panel data analysis, the test to determine the presence of 
autocorrelation in the panel is based on the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
(Carneiro, 2006). The test involves checking the significance of null hypothesis that 
there is no idiosyncratic error of a linear panel data model. The significant F-value 
shows the existence of autocorrelation in the model. This problem can be solved by 
using the random effect model or the fixed effects model since the model always 
provides consistent estimators (Gujarati & Porter, 2009; Wooldridge, 2003). 
 
3.8.2.4. Multicollinearity Test 
 
Panel data analysis, to some extent, is capable of reducing the multicollinearity 
problem (Baltagi, Bratberg & Holmås, 2005). Multicollinearity checking is a 
common diagnostic test to ensure that none of the independent variables are highly 
linked, which can result in massive variance bias. The high correlation between two 
(2) independent variables would result in a huge bias in variance, therefore, causing 
the estimations to be unreliable (Baltagi et al., 2005). The Variance inflation Factor 
(VIF) is an example of the test that is common to study such a problem. It treats one 
(1) of the independent variables as dependent variables and the remaining 
independent variables as independent variables. Correlation Matrix and Condition 
Index are other tests that have been used by many researchers (Anderson & Zeghal, 
1994). It is expected that, by carrying out a multicollinearity test for the panel data, 
one (1) of the basic requirements for econometric regression is met. 
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3.8.3. Correlations 
 
The current study identify the interconnection among the variables. The result of the 
analyses show the direction, significance, and nature of the correlation of the 
variables in the study and this relationship is analysed using the person correlation. 
 
3.8.4. Panel Data Analysis 
 
According to Baltagi et al. (2005), panel data refers to the pooling of observations 
on a cross section over several times. Thus, allowing the researcher to study the 
dynamics of change over the short time series. In this study, due to the potential 
benefits provided by this approach panel data structure rather than cross sectional or 
time series will be utilize, in particular it can improve the quantity and quality of data 
that could not be provided with either a cross sectional or a time series alone (Greene, 
2003). 
 
The advantage of panel data analysis over other techniques include reducing the 
collinearity among independent variables and increasing the number of observations 
and degree of freedom; improving the efficiency of econometrics estimation and also 
account for heterogeneity of the variables as well as its suitability of studying 
dynamics changes in a firm or industry (Baltagi, 2008). 
 
3.8.4.1. Fixed Effect Model  
 
Fixed effect model displays the difference in intercepts for different entities with 
constant slope across entities and time. It can be one-way entity fixed effect, one-
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way time fixed effect or two ways fixed effects (entity and time). Two methods are 
employ; the Least Square Dummy Variable Estimator (LSDV) appropriate for small 
number of entities and Fixed Effect Estimators (FEE) appropriate for large number 
of entities (Greene, 2008). 
 
3.8.4.2. Random Effect Model  
 
For Random effect model, the variation across entities is considered to be random 
and uncorrelated with the independent variables in the model. The model can absorb 
time-invariant variables.  The random effect model would have a random constant 
term (Greene, 2003). 
 
3.8.4.3. Hauseman Test  
Hausman test is conducted to decide between random effect and fixed effect. Al-
Ajmi (2008) explain that when the hausman test result is significant in the model 
fixed effect is preferable over random effect. 
 
3.8.4.4. Breusch and Pegan Langrangian Multiplier Test 
 
If the random effect is considered most efficient and appropriate from the above 
Hauseman test, the analysis will proceed to decide between random effect model and 
pooled OLS model using Breusch and Pegan Lagrangian multiplier test. 
𝐻𝑜: There is no individual difference that is, no random effect  
𝐻1: There is individual difference among the coefficients that is, random effect exist 
If the 𝐻𝑜 is rejected, random effect exist and if 𝐻𝑜 fail to be rejected, random effect 
does not exist thus pooled OLS would be more appropriate 
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3.8.5. Multiple Linear Regression Analysis 
 
This study employs multiple linear regressions (MLR) specifically panel data 
analyses to study the relationship between the financial performance and board 
characteristics (board size, board independent, and board financial knowledge). 
Following Battaglia, F., & Gallo, A. (2015).   The study clusters the standard error 
at panel lid. This is because in the sample same bank may be present in different 
years, it is suitable to enable the errors to be related for the same intermediary 
overtime. The study obtained standard errors robust heteroscedasticity. 
 
3.9. Summary the Chapter  
 
The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between board and risk 
management committee attributes on the financial performance of listed banks in 
Nigeria. This present chapter explains the methodology used in the study and show 
the hypotheses that have been developed. Furthermore, theoretical framework, 
research methodology, the research design and data analysis were also discussed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1. Introduction   
 
This section provides the research findings from the random effect model. The 
chapter is divided into sub-sections, which comprises of descriptive statistic, 
correlation analysis, and analysis of choice among random effect and pooled OLS 
and diagnostic checks. Additionally, the linear regression analysis is also explained 
in the last section, and summary of the chapter. Stata software version 14 was used 
to analyse data from the annual reports of listed banks in Nigeria. 
 
4.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Descriptive analysis is conducted to provide brief information about the sample 
target that can prompt simple and better explanation of data (Genser, Cooper, 
Yazdanbakhsh, Barreto, & Rodrigues, 2007). Table 4.1 below show the mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum of the variables in the study resulting 
from the Stata 14 
Table 4.1  
Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
ROA 2.120 1.219 0.360 4.660 
BOARDSIZE 13.500 2.761 7.000 19.000 
BOARDFINKNW 0.403 0.104 0.176 0.600 
BOARDINDE 0.678 0.139 0.500 0.923 
RMCSIZE 6.238 2.272 3.000 13.000 
RMCINDE 0.748 0.180 0.500 1.000 
SEPARATE RMC 0.500 0.506 0.000 1.000 
BANKAGE 42.214 33.332 2.000 122.000 
LEVERAGE 14.295 4.295 6.110 26.160 
FIRMSIZE 9.202 0.356 8.556 9.794 
ROA = return on asset; BOARDSIZE = Board size; BOARDFINKNW = Board financial     
knowledge; BOARDINDE = Board independence; RMCSIZE = Risk management committee 
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size; RMCINDE = Risk management committee independence; SEPARATE RMC = Separate 
risk management committee; BANKAGE = Bank age; LEVERAGE = Leverage; FIRMSIZE 
= Firm size. 
N= 42 
 
 
From table 4.1 above, it displays the result for descriptive statistics taken from the 
variables incorporated into the model. The descriptive statistics which involve mean, 
standard deviation, minimum and maximum which was run with Stata version 14. 
From the descriptive analysis the overall average mean for return on asset (ROA) is 
2.120 with maximum 4.660 and minimum of 0.360%.  With regards to the CG 
variables, the result from the descriptive statistics of board size (BOARDSIZE), 
shows that the mean value for board size is 13.500 with a minimum of 7 members 
and the maximum of 19 members, this implies that the listed banks in Nigeria have 
comply with CBN code of corporate governance (2014) which require banks to have 
a minimum of 5 and maximum of 20 members in their board. Also the result reveal 
that the mean for board financial knowledge (BOARDFINKNW) is 0.403 with the 
minimum number of 0.176 members and the maximum of 0.600 members in the 
Nigerian banks. 
 
The statistical outcome relating to the board independence (BOARDINDE) ranges 
indicate the mean of 0.678 with a minimum of 0.500 members and maximum of 
0.923 members. Unlike board size, the risk management committee size (RMCSIZE) 
mean value is 6.238, the minimum members on the committee is 3 and maximum 13 
members. The risk management committee independence (RMCINDE) recorded a 
mean of 0.748, with a minimum of 0.500 members and maximum of 1.000 members 
on the risk committee. 
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Meanwhile, the existence of separate risk management committee (SRMC) 
measured as a dummy variable, one (1) if there exist a separate risk committee 
otherwise zero (0) recorded a mean of 0.500, with a minimum of 0.000, and a 
maximum of 1.000. With regard to bank age (BANKAGE), the mean value of the 
bank is 42.214 with a minimum age of 2Years and a maximum age of 122 years for 
listed banks in Nigeria. As for leverage (LEVERAGE) the outcome in table 4.1 
shows that the mean of leverage is around 14.295, having a minimum of 6.110 and a 
maximum of 26.160  
 
Lastly the mean value for firm size (FIRMSIZE) shows the mean value of 9.202 for 
listed banks in Nigeria     with a minimum of 8.556 and a maximum of 9.794. 
However, firm size influence firm performance and normally used as control variable 
in the corporate governance literatures (e.g. De Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; 
Ghosh, 2006). 
 
4.3. Correlation Analysis 
 
Correlations analysis is used to discuss the level by which one variable is associated 
to another (Asteriou & Hall, 2007). Hair et al, (2010) suggest that a correlation should 
not exceed 0.7 to ensure multicollinearity problem does not exist in the regression 
model. However a correlation 0.736 reported in this study is within the threshold of 
90% suggest by pallant (2007) and gujarati (2004).  
 
This study begins by measuring the relationship between independent variables to 
dependent. Therefore, correlation analysis was utilized to explore the independent 
variables’ relationship as this would help in estimating numerous models, which 
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discover no relationship in circumstances where the correlation estimation is 0. 
While correlation of ± 1.0 means perfectly negative or positive relationship. Zero (0) 
for no relationship and one (1) means a perfect relationship. In addition, the 
relationship is seen as small where r = ± 0.30 to ± 0.49 and where r ≥ 0.50 the 
relationship strength is thought to be substantial. Table 4.2 presents the correlation 
between the variables.  
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Table 4.2: 
Pearson correlation  
     1      2        3     4         5     6       7     8     9      10 
ROA 1.000 
         
BOARDSIZE 0.129 1.000 
        
BOARDFINKNW -0.344* -0.127 1.000 
       
BOARDINDE -0.250 -0.736*** 0.077 1.000 
      
RMCSIZE 0.167 0.649*** -0.392* -0.465** 1.000 
     
RMCINDE -0.279 -0.413** 0.100 0.468** -0.660*** 1.000 
    
SRMC 0.279 0.271 0.111 -0.070 0.000 -0.241 1.000 
   
BANKAGE -0.319* 0.146 -0.174 -0.021 0.339* -0.327* -0.323* 1.000 
  
LEVERAGE 0.035 -0.032 -0.500*** 0.142 0.206 0.035 0.136 -0.154 1.000 
 
FIRMSIZE 0.160 -0.073 0.305* 0.162 -0.383* 0.143 0.056 0.046 -0.323* 1.000 
ROA = return on asset; BOARDSIZE = Board size; BOARDFINKNW = Board financial knowledge; BOARDINDE = Board independence; RMCSIZE = Risk management 
committee size; RMCINDE = Risk management committee independence; SEPARATE RMC = Separate risk management committee; BANKAGE = Bank age; LEVERAGE 
= Leverage; FIRMSIZE = Firm size.8, ** p<0.05* p<0.01***p<0.001 
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Table 4.2 above shows significant correlation, positively weak, and negative 
significant correlation concerning dependent variable (ROA) and independent 
variables. The correlation between firm size, board size, risk management committee 
size, and existence of separate risk management committee with ROA is 0.160, 
0.129, 0.167, and 0.279 respectively, which shows they are positively correlated. 
However, the ROA is positively correlated with leverage with a weak value of 0.035. 
Furthermore, a weak negative and significant correlation was found between board 
independence, board financial knowledge, bank age, risk management committee 
independence and ROA of -0.250, -0.344, -0.319, and -0.279 respectively. 
 
The findings also show a strong positive significant correlation between risk 
management committee size with board size with a correlation value of 0.649 at 1% 
significance level. However a negative significance correlation exist between board 
size and board independence at 1% level of significance.  And also show negative 
significant correlation between risk management committee independence with 
board size with a moderate value of -0.413 at 5% level of significance.  But the board 
size shows a weak positive significant correlation with separate risk management 
committee and bank age of 0.271 and 0.146 value. Board size has negative 
correlation with leverage and firm size with a week value of -0.032, and -0.073 
respectively. 
 
BOARDFINKNW has negative significance correlation with leverage at 1% level of 
significance and also a week positive correlation with board independence, risk 
management committee independence, and separate risk management committee 
with correlation value of 0.077, 0.100, and 0.111 respectively. And a positive 
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correlation was found between firm size and BOARDFINKNW with a value of 0305 
at 10% level of significance. However, risk management committee size is 
negatively correlated with BOARDFINKNW with a value of -0.392 at 10% level of 
significance. Finally bank age has a negative correlation with BOARDFINKNW 
with a value of -0.174. 
 
BOARDINDE was found to have a positive correlation with risk management 
committee independence with a moderate value of 0.468 at 5% level of significance. 
However, risk management committee size has a negative correlation with 
BOARDINDE with the value of -0.465 at 5% level of significance. Leverage and 
firm size has a positive correlation with BOARDINDE with weak value of 0.142 and 
0.162 respectively. Finally BOARDINDE has a negative correlation with separate 
risk management committee and bank age with a value of -0.070 and -0.021 
respectively. 
 
RMCS is negatively significant correlation with risk management committee 
independence with a value of -0.660 at 1% level of significant. Also there is no 
relationship between RMCS and separate risk management committee with value of 
0. Leverage has a moderate significant correlation with RMCS with a value of 0.206. 
Furthermore RMCS has a weak negative significant correlation with firm size with 
value of -0.383 at 10% level of significance of 10%. Lastly RMCS has a positive 
significant correlation with bank age with moderate value of 0.339 at 10% level of 
significant. 
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RMCINDE was found to have a positive correlation with board independence, with 
a moderate value of 0.468 at 5% level of significant.  RMCINDE have a negative 
significant correlation with risk management committee size with a value of -0.660 
at 1% level of significant. Also, negative significant correlation exist between 
RMCINDE and board size with a value of -0.413 at 5% level of significance. 
Separate risk management committee is negatively correlated with RMCINDE with 
a value of -0.241. A weak and positive significant correlation was found between 
leverage and firm size with RMCINDE with a value of 0.035 and 0.143 respectively. 
Finally a negative correlation was found between RMCINDE and bank age with a 
value of -0.327 at 10% level of significance. And significant correlation with board 
independence with value of 0.393 at 10% level of significance. 
 
SRMC has week positive correlation with board size, board financial knowledge, 
leverage, and firm size with value of 0.271, 0.111, 0.136, and 0.056 respectively. 
Board independence and risk management committee independence has a negative 
correlation with SRMC with value of -0.070 and -0.241 respectively. No relationship 
exist between SRMC and risk management committee size with value of 0.000.A 
weak negative significant correlation with bank age with value of -0.323 at 10% level 
of significant. 
 
BANKAGE is positively correlated with board size with value of 0,146. Board 
financial knowledge, and board independence has a negative significant correlation 
with BANKAGE with value of -0.174, and -0.021 respectively. Risk management 
committee size has moderate significant correlation with BANKAGE with value of 
0.339 at 10% level of significance. A negative significant correlation exist between 
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BANKAGE with risk management committee independence and separate risk 
management committee with value of -0.327 and -0.323 at 10% level of significance. 
Also a weak negative significant correlation between BANKAGE and leverage was 
found with a value of -0.154. And finally a positive and insignificant correlation was 
found between BANKAGE and firm size with a value of 0.046. 
 
LEVERAGE has a weak negative correlation with bank age, and board size with a 
value of -0.032, -0.154 respectively. Furthermore board independence, risk 
management committee size, risk management committee independence, and 
separate risk management committee has a weak positive significant correlation with 
a value of 0.142, 0.206 and 0.035 and 0.136 respectively. Board financial knowledge 
has a negative significant correlation with LEVERAGE with a value of -0.500 at 1% 
level of significant. Also firm size has negative significant correlation with 
LEVERAGE with a value of -0.323 at 10% level of significant. 
 
FIRMSIZE has a weak negative significant correlation with risk management 
committee size and leverage with value of -0.383 and -0.323 at 10% level of 
significant. And also board financial knowledge has a positive correlation with 
FIRMSIZE with a value of -0.305 at level of significant of 10%. Board 
independence, risk management committee independence, separate risk management 
committee and bank age has a weak correlation with FIRMSIZE with a value of 
0.162, 0.143, 0.056 and 0.046 respectively. Furthermore FIRMSIZE has negative 
insignificant correlation with board size with value of -0.073. 
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4.4. Model Selection between Fixed Effect and Random Effects 
 
Hausman test is conducted to decide between random effect and fixed effect. This 
test evaluates the influence of alternative estimator versus an estimator. Researchers 
use it to assess whether a statistical model matches the data (Oyerinde, 2014). 
Table 4.3 
Hausman specification test 
            Chi2                    p-value  
     Hausman            6.78                    0.5608  
     H0         Reject                     Reject   
 
The p-value (0.5608) for the Hausman test as indicated in Table 4.3 is insignificant 
and therefore established that RE model is more appropriate, since there is no proof 
of significant disparities within the banks; hence, RE regression can be run (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2012). Meaning that reject fixed effect and accepted random effect. 
 
4.5. Random Effect and Pooled OLS Test 
 
Breusch and Pegan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test is carried out as research analysis 
for aim of selecting the most fitting model between random effect and pooled OLS 
as shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4. 
Breusch and Pegan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects estimates result 
 
  var sd = sqrt (var) 
Roa 1.486666 1.219289  
e 0.32821 0.5728964  
u 0.565546 0.7520278   
 
 
Test: Var (u) = 0 
Chibar2 (01) = 2.69 
Prob > chibar2 = 0.0505 
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From the above table 4.4 shows, the probability value of Breusch and Pegan 
lagrangian multiplier test (0.0505) is significant. However, the test perfectly suggests 
that random effect model is the most effective and appropriate over pool OLS. 
Moreover, treating the entities as the same might be as a result of employing a small 
sample of companies from the same sector (banking sector), thereby assuming the 
intercept and the coefficients as the same for all the entities. 
 
Nevertheless, to further ensure the validity of this result and draw an inference from 
the estimated results, six (6) different diagnostic tests were carried out. These 
comprise normality test using kernel density test and Cameron & Trivedi’s 
decomposition of IM-test for heteroskedasticity, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test 
for multicollinearity, functional form formulation (linearity) test, Ramsey reset test 
for omitted variables and Wooldridge test for serial correlation as presented below: 
 
4.6 Kernel Density estimate 
The Kernel density estimate (KDE) is a comprehensive technique, which contains 
smoothing of the data and holding the overall structure. Is an effective method for 
remodelling an obscure population from a random sample of data (Thompson, 2006). 
Histograms are typical vehicle for indicating medium sized data are distributed 
graphically, yet they endure some defects 
 
The KDEs are superior at recovering remarkable structure and should be used rather 
the conventional histograms or frequency polygons to examine in details the data 
distributions. As explain by Salgado-Ugarte and Perez-Hernandez (2003), the fixed 
bandwidth KDEs are susceptible to noise in any low count interval of the distribution 
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and miss distribution details in areas where data converge. In more specialized terms, 
the bandwidth (h) should rise with f(x) to decrease variance and would reduce with 
|f′′(x)| to reduced bias. The ordinary kernel estimator suffer adaptivity and thus 
manages to over smooth regions with excessive structure and to under smooth the 
distribution tails or to slightly data range with small structure (Simonoff & Tsai, 
1999). To address this issue, one thought is to expand the window width in ranges of 
low data densities and to lessening it at intervals with huge counts. Also, it is 
conceivable to retrieve detail where data emphasis and to dispose noise where 
observations are aparse (Fox, 1991). 
 
Figure 4.1 show the data obtained for the current study used normal pattern since all 
the bars on the KDE were closed to a normal curve. Accordingly, Figure 4.1 show 
that normality assumptions were not violated in the current study. 
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Figure 4.1 
Kernel density estimate 
  
In the above Figure 4.1, default width was used. Kernel density is smarter than two-
way histogram in that its default width is not a fixed constant. Based on the figure 
shown above, the kernel density estimate shows the data are normally distributed. 
 
4.7.    Test 2: Test for Heteroskedasticity 
 
The following hypothesis was tested to determine the variance consistency of the 
random error 
Breusch-pegan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity predicts that: 
𝑯𝟎: Constant variance 
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The result of the test using Breusch-pegan/Cook-Weisberg test shows that the 
probability value of the chi-square is 33.24% far above 5% rejection region. The chi-
square and probability value of the test is shown below: 
. Chi2 (1) = 0.94 
. Prob > chi2 = 0.3324 
 
From the above result the study fails to reject the null hypothesis, however, concludes 
that, the residuals of the data is homogeneous in another word there is no 
heteroskedasticity problem. Thus, the error term(s) of an individual entity does not 
affect the independent variables of another entity. Hence, there is a constant variance 
in the distribution. This result was supported by Cameron & Trivedi’s composition 
of IM-test as presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 
Heteroskedasticity Test 
Source Chi2 df p 
Heterokedasticity 42 41 0.4274 
Skewness 12.56 9 0.1834 
Kurtosis 0.63 1 0.4274 
Total 55.19 51 0.3192 
 
From the result of the above table, the study does not reject the null hypothesis, which 
explain that the error term variance is constant and thereby concluding that there is 
no problem of heteroskedasticity in the in the residuals of the data.  
 
4.8.    Test 3: Test for Multicollinearity 
 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test was carried out to determine if high collinearity 
between the independent variables exist or not. In another words, whether two or 
more variables are measuring the same thing or variables are independent of one 
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another. VIF result of 10 and above show high collinearity, which require solution. 
If the multicollinearity test discovers the existence of collinearity, a strong 
relationship among the independent variables exist. Hair Jr, Anderson, Tatham, et al. 
(1995) discuss that one of the many methods to know  the presence of the correlation 
between independent variables is to conduct multicollinearity test that explain the 
degree by which one variable’s effect can be managed by the other variable. 
Table 4.6 
Multicollinearity Test using Variance Inflation Factor  
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
BOARDSIZE 5.99 0.167084 
BOARDFINKW 1.67 0.172194 
BOARDINDE 3.84 0.260676 
RMCSIZE  5.81 0.268747 
RMCINDE 3.72 0.437324 
SRMC 2.29 0.560964 
AGECORP 1.78 0.576005 
LEVERAGE 1.74 0.600280 
FIRMSIZE 1.51 0.663164 
Mean VIF 3.15 
 
 
In a situation whereby the VIF is more than 10, it means that the variables are highly 
interrelated which incite a multicollinearity problem (Greene, 2008). Along these, 
the multicollinearity test using VIF as show in Table 4.6 above finds the absence of 
multicollinearity problem because VIF for every independent variable is less than 
the threshold value of 10, similarly the mean VIF value is reported as 3.15 far less 
than < 10. So, the study concludes multicollinearity issue does not exis among the 
independent variables. Thus, each variable is proved to be independent in explaining 
the dependent variable. 
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4.9.    Test 5: Omitted Variables Test 
 
The test for Ramsey reset using powers of the fitted values of return on asset (ROA) 
length was conducted to know whether the model has any omitted variable or not, 
the result obtain from the test is presented below: 
 
F (3, 29) = 1.30 
Prob > F = 0.1271 
 
From the above test the null hypothesis (𝐻0) expressed that; the model has no omitted 
variables. Since the probability value is not significance, the researcher cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that there is no omitted variable in the model, and therefore 
concludes that, the model has no omitted variables. 
 
4.10.    Test 6: Test for Serial Correlation 
 
The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data was carried out in order to 
determine whether there exist a serial correlation or otherwise, the result obtains is 
shows below: 
 
F (1, 3) = 0.000 
Prob > F = 0.9025 
The null hypothesis (𝐻0) of the above test stated that, there is no autocorrelation 
problem. However, going by the probability value which is insignificant the study 
accept the null hypothesis. 
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4.11.    Linear Regression Analysis 
In this study, the regression result is based on robust standard error that is clustering 
or adjusting the standard error at panel lid. The analysis of linear regression is used 
as a statistical technique to examine the relationship that arise among the dependent 
variable and six (6) independent variables comprising board size, board 
independence, board financial knowledge, risk management committee size, risk 
management committee independence, separate risk management committee, and 
three control variables which are firm size, leverage and bank age for 14 listed banks 
in Nigeria. Table 4.8 shows the result of random effect model used in the study  
 
Table 4.7 
Result of the Estimated Regression 
 RANDOM RANDOM ROBURST 
Variables Coef Std. Err. Z    P>|z|      Coef Std.Err z P>|z|       
BOARDSIZE -0.230 0.108 -2.13 0.033 -0.230 0.085 -2.720 0.007 
BOARDFINKNW -3.326 1,797 -1.85 0.064 -3.326 1.692 -1.970 0.049 
BOARDINDE -4.404 1.855 -2.37 0.018 -4.404 1.547 -2.850 0.004 
RMCSIZE 0.268 0.148 1.81 0.07 0.268 0.073 3.680 0.000 
RMCINDE -0.322 1.288 -0.25 0.803 -0.322 0,802 -0.400 0.688 
SRMC 0.888 0.531 1.67 0.094 0.888 0.480 1.850 0.064 
BANKAGE -0.030 0.020 -1.5 0.134 -0.030 0.013 -2.330 0.020 
LEVERAGE -0.053 0.033 -1.61 0.108 -0.053 0.029 -1.820 0.069 
FIRMSIZE 1.550 0.767 2.02 0.043 1.550 0.658 2.360 0.018 
Cons -5.248 7.114 -0.74 0.461 -5.248 7.032 -0.750 0.455 
Wald chi2                                                          18.53    183.61 
Prob > chi2    0.030    0.000 
R-Sqr                                                                  0.496    0.496 
Number of groups    14    14 
Obs.                                                                          42    42 
ROA = return on asset; BOARDSIZE = Board size; BOARDFINKNW = Board financial 
knowledge; BOARDINDE = Board independence; RMCSIZE = Risk management committee 
size; RMCINDE = Risk management committee independence; SEPARATE RMC = Separate 
risk management committee; BANKAGE = Bank age; LEVERAGE = Leverage; FIRMSIZE 
= Firm size.8, ** p<0.05* p<0.01***p<0.001 
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4.11.1.    (ROA as Dependent Variable) 
 
In testing the hypotheses of the study using a linear regression analysis, some 
indicators were engaged. Some of which are using the R2 (R Square) Coefficient, 
that assesses the robustness of the regression equation. Also referred to as the 
coefficient of determination which uncovers the point of difference between the 
dependent variable which is described by model of the variables. The R2 shows the 
point of difference of dependent variable resulting from the collective influence of 
the independent variable. The R2 of 49.62% in the study shows the independent 
variables (board size, board independence, board financial knowledge, risk 
management committee size, risk management committee independence, separate 
risk management committee) variability on the dependent variable (ROA). The 
remaining 50.38% is accounted for by other factors that are not included in this study. 
 
4.11.2.    Hypotheses Testing 
 
In this section, the result of the analysis of the relationship between financial 
performance (ROA as dependent variable) and board size, board independence, 
board financial knowledge, risk management committee size, risk management 
committee independence and separate risk management committee are the dependent 
variables. Whereas the control variables are the firm size, leverage and bank age as 
discuss in the study are presented through linear regression analysis. 
 
84 
 
 
4.11.2.1.    Board size and ROA 
 
According to table 4.7 board size has a negative significant relationship with 
financial performance (ROA) at 1% level of significant. The outcome support the 
first hypothesis (H1) that there is a negative relationship between board size and 
financial performance. This negative value indicate that if there is an increase in 
board size, will result to decrease in financial performance (ROA) and vice versa. 
This outcome is similar to that found in the study Shakir (2008) who discover a 
negative significant relationship between board size and financial performance 
(ROA). 
 
Based on this result, it indicate that smaller board will solve the problem of individual 
free riding and enhanced their decision making. Efficiency is increase if the number 
of directors is small because decisions are easier to make. However agency theory 
advocates or argues that a considerable raise in number of board size can result and 
will lead to delay in the decision-making process. 
 
4.11.2.2.    Board independence and ROA 
 
As revealed in table 4.7 the study discover a negative significant relationship 
between the board independence and financial performance (ROA), at 1% level of 
significant. The findings do not support the second hypothesis (H2) which state there 
is a positive relationship between board independence and financial performance 
(ROA). This negative value indicate that when there is a decrease in board 
independence, financial performance (ROA) will increase and reverse is the case. 
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Abdullah (2004) also found similar outcome that independence of board members is 
negatively link with firm performance (ROA). 
 
4.11.2.3.    Board financial knowledge and ROA 
 
As revealed on table 4.7 board financial knowledge has a negative significant 
relationship with financial performance (ROA) at 5% level of significant. This 
findings do not support the third hypothesis (H3) that there is a positive relationship 
between board financial knowledge and financial performance. The negative value 
show that when there is decrease in board financial knowledge, financial 
performance will increase and vice versa. A similar result was found by Darmadi 
(2013) that educational backgrounds do not matter to firm profitability. There may 
be other factors apart from educational background such as experiences, training, and 
managerial skills that lead to better firm profitability. 
 
4.11.2.4.    Risk management committee independence and ROA 
 
As reveal in the table 4.7 risk management committee independence has a negative 
and insignificant relationship with financial performance (ROA). This finding reject 
the forth hypothesis (H4) that there is a relationship between risk management 
committee independent and financial performance. This shows that risk management 
committee independence have no any influence on financial performance (ROA). 
Also a similar study conducted by kallamu, B.S. (2015) reported that risk 
management committee independence is negatively related with ROA. 
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4.11.2.5.    Risk management committee size and ROA 
 
As indicated form table 4.7 risk management committee size has a positive 
significant relationship with financial performance (ROA) at 1% level of 
significance. This findings do not support the fifth hypothesis (H5) that there is a 
negative relationship between risk management committee size and financial 
performance. The positive value shows that if there is an increase in risk management 
committee size, financial performance (ROA) will also increase and vice versa. The 
findings of this study is similar to that found by Battaglia, F., & Gallo, A. (2015). 
They investigated whether board of directors and risk management related corporate 
governance mechanisms are associated with better bank performance during the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 for a sample of Chinese and Indian listed banks. They 
discover that there is a positive significant relationship between risk management 
committee size and financial performance (ROA). 
 
4.11.2.6.    Existence of separate risk management committee and ROA 
 
According to the table 4.8 presence of separate risk management committee has a 
positive significant relationship with financial performance (ROA) at 10% level of 
significant. The findings support the sixth hypothesis (H6) that there is a positive 
relationship between the existence of separate risk management committee and 
financial performance. The positive value shows that if there is presence of separate 
risk management committee, financial performance (ROA) will also increase and 
reverse is the case. This finding of this study is similar to that found by Hoyt & 
Liebenberg, (2011) that shows there is a positive relationship between risk 
management committee and firm performance (ROA). 
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However, the existence of risk management committee as distinct board committees 
in charge with particular part of the board function allow the directors to focus on 
specific area and spend more time on their work. Separate RMC result to better 
control of risk which decrease losses and increase performance. 
 
4.11.2.7.    Control Variables and ROA 
In this study three control variables were employ, which are the firm size, leverage, 
and bank age. First of them is the firm size. The use of firm size as a control variable 
is being justified by the findings of companies with numerous distinct characteristics. 
In addition, the firm size affects firm performance and is usually utilized as control 
variable in experimental research devoted to the corporate governance (De Andres 
et al., 2005; Ghosh, 2006; Cheung et al., 2007). The effect of firm size on the 
corporate governance has also been reported in the outcomes that portray bigger 
companies to be less useful in comparison to their smaller counterparts even though 
they adhere to government bureaucracy, they are riddled with uncertainty and 
complex agency problems (Patro et al., 2003). The result in table 4.7 shows a positive 
significant relationship between firm size and ROA at 10% level of significant. This 
is consistent with the one found in the study of Klapper and Love (2003), they 
discovered that a positively significant relationship exist between firm size and 
performance. 
 
The second control variable is bank age. The results in Table 4.7 shows a negative 
relationship and significantly related with ROA at 5% level of significant. The 
outcomes is not consistent  with the previous studies found by Evans, (1987) and 
Stinchcombe, (1965), which indicated that an increase in the age of a company 
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accompanies an increase in management abilities and skills to improve firm 
performance. 
 
The third control variable leverage, the result presented in the table 4.7 shows a 
leverage has a negative significant relationship with financial performance (ROA) at 
10% level of significance. Which means any attempt to increase debt finances in the 
company will have a negative influence on firm performance and this study is 
consistent with Eng and Mark (2003). 
 
4.12. Summary of the Chapter  
 
This chapter discussed the outcome from random effect model analyses and 
diagnostics test result in order to establish relationship effect between board 
characteristics, and risk management committee attributes on financial performance 
(ROA) on listed banks in Nigeria. This is done in conjunction with relevant theories 
and literature review in order to arrive at a logical conclusion. The research depend 
on secondary data obtained from the annual report and data stream using sample of 
fourteen (14) listed banks.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss and conclude the main findings of the study 
as well as to suggest some recommendations for the appropriate regulatory bodies, 
relevant agencies and interested parties to consider. The chapter is divided into three 
sections. Starting with introduction of the chapter. The second section is the summary 
of the research, and the implication of the study. Lastly, it presents the limitations of 
the study and recommendations for future studies. 
 
5.2. Summary of the study 
 
The study investigates 14 listed banks that are quoted in the Nigeria stock exchange 
for the time frame of 2014 to 2016. The aim of this study is to investigate the effect 
of board and risk management committee attributes on the financial performance of 
listed banks in Nigerian. For this research, board and risk management committee 
attributes are to be represented by board size, board independence, board financial 
knowledge, risk management committee independence, risk management committee 
size, and existence of separate risk management committee to determine their effect 
on the financial performance of listed Nigerian banks. From the results obtained, the 
study indicates that board size is negatively related with financial performance 
(ROA), hereby opining that an increase in the directors of the company will have a 
negative effects on firm performance. However, the board independence has a 
negative significant relationship with financial performance (ROA). Furthermore, 
board financial knowledge has a negative significant relationship with financial 
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performance (ROA). Risk management committee independence has a negative 
insignificant relationship with financial performance (ROA), this means that it does 
not seem to influence the banks financial performance. In addition the study finds 
that the relationship between risk management committee size and financial 
performance (ROA) is positive and significant in listed banks in Nigeria. 
Nonetheless, existence of separate risk management committee has a positive and 
significant relationship with financial performance (ROA). This shows that risk 
management committee  has impact in enhancing firm performance of listed banks 
in Nigeria in performing its oversight responsibilities in assessing, evaluating the risk 
apatite of the company for the purpose of avoiding unprofitable investment that will 
give raise to losses which can affect the overall performance and return to the 
company and the stakeholders in general. 
 
Other variables which includes: firm size, bank age and leverage, were also 
investigated. The study documents a positive and significant relationship between 
the firm size and financial performance, for bank age it was found that a negative 
and significant relationship exist with the financial performance. Finally, leverage 
shows a negative and significant relationship with financial performance. 
 
5.3. Implication of the Study 
 
The research investigate the effect of board and risk management committee 
attributes on the financial performance of listed banks in Nigerian. The findings of 
the study would give invaluable insight to the stock market, government, auditing 
and accounting regulators and auditing and accounting professional bodies, as to the 
extend which codes of corporate governance degrees, regulators, resolutions, and 
91 
 
laws are implemented by the banks and other financial services. Further, the study 
provides knowledge to the government and regulators when making new policies or 
deliberating on issues regarding corporate governance in relation to bank 
performance. Moreover, the importance of having a separate risk management 
committee should be emphasis. It has been known that both the shareholders and 
companies are depending on the corporate governance mechanism particularly RMC 
as a way of mitigating or reducing risk and as a direction to enhancing value, a weak 
risk committee would turn into persistent throughout the organisation and which 
eventually leads to poor share price performance (Institutional Shareholder Services 
2005). 
 
5.4.   Limitation of the Study 
 
They are very few researches on risk management committee attributes and bank 
financial performance in the Nigerian banking industry. Most of the empirical studies 
referenced in this study were studies carried out in developed countries. Moreover, 
due to the differences in environment and culture between these countries and 
Nigeria, the results of these studies might not be appropriate and suitable to apply in 
the Nigerian setting. 
 
Some of the data used in this study was collected from data-stream. Even though the 
data-stream is source of data collection, it still provides missing data of some certain 
banks in Nigeria. 
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5.5. Recommendation for Future Studies 
 
The limitations of the study have urged the following recommendations for further 
Research as itemized below: 
 
To improve the model of this study, future research should incorporate other 
corporate governance variables like risk management expertise, ownership 
concentration, director remuneration, management ownership and board meetings. 
 
Advance researches are also essential on the board’s behavioural features. There is 
the need to go beyond the quantitative research, which is yielding a mixture of 
results, to a more qualitative approach such as how boards work. Expanding this 
current research into a wider study of decision making and board dynamics would 
be the beginning of building a more understanding of corporate governance. 
 
The sampled firms for this study were based on financial sector of listed banks in 
Nigeria. The reason for selecting this sector is because of the contribution these 
sector is making toward economic growth and the GDP of the country and with high 
number of banks listed on the NSE thereby creating a high number of job, they also 
implemented the corporate governance structure. Therefore, further research is 
suggested to examine this issue in other sectors by applying different method of data 
analysis technique. 
 
Lastly, there is a call to launch a cohesive corporate institution/body charged with 
the duty of collecting information on corporate governance and building the 
applicable indices to encourage corporate governance study in Nigeria. 
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5.6.     Conclusion 
 
The objective of the research which is to investigate the effect of board 
characteristics, and risk management committee attributes on financial performance 
of listed banks in Nigeria has been accomplished. The study examines the 
relationship between the six independent variables (board size, board independence, 
board financial knowledge, risk management committee independence, risk 
management committee size, and existence of separate risk management committee. 
with the dependent variable which is return on asset (ROA). RMC existence is 
measured as a dummy variable of “1” is used for the banks that set up a separate risk 
management committee and “0” if ortherwise.  Based on the outcome of the panel 
data analysis, only one variable namely risk management committee independence 
was discover to be negative and insignificant relationship with banks financial 
performance which was measured using return on asset (ROA). 
 
Finally a Risk management Committee should be established to provide oversight of 
management’s activities in managing credit, market, liquidity, operational, legal and 
other risks of the institution.  RMC aids the board in regulating the company’s risks 
and limit the function of audit committee related to corporation risk. 
 
 
  
94 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abdullah, S. N. (2004). Board Composition, CEO Duality and Performance amongst 
Malaysian Listed Companies. Corporate Governance, 4(4), 47-61.  
Adams, R. And Mehran, H. (2005) Corporate Perfomance, Board Structure And 
Their Determinants In The Banking Industry. Available At: 
Http://Papers.Ssrn.Com/Sol3/ Papers.Cfm?Abstract_Id=302593. (Accessed: 
4 January 2015). 
Adams, R., & Mehran, H. (2003). Is Corporate Governance Different For Bank 
Holdingcompanies!? FRBNY Economic Policy Review, (April), 123–142. 
Http://Doi.Org/10.2139/Ssrn.387561 
Adams, R., Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2008). The Role of Boards Of 
Directors In Corporate Governance: A Conceptual Framework And Survey. 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Adegbite, E. (2012). Corporate Governance in the Nigerian Banking Industry: 
Towards Governmental Engagement. International Journal of Business 
Governance and Ethics, 7, 209-231. Doi:10.1504/IJBGE.2012.050039 
Adegbite, E., & Nakajima, C. (2011). Corporate Governance and Responsibility in 
Nigeria. International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, 8, 252-271. 
Doi:10.1057/Jdg.2011.2 
Adegbite, E., & Nakajima, C. (2011). Institutional Determinants of Good Corporate 
Governance: The Case of Nigeria. Firm-Level Internationalisation, 
Regionalism and Globalisation, 379-396 
Adegbite, E., Amaeshi, K., & Amao, O. (2012). The Politics of Shareholder 
Activism in Nigeria. Journal of Business Ethics, 105(3), 389-402. 
Ademola T, O., & Adedoyin, S. (2001). Corporate Governance in Nigeria. Paper 
Presented At The Conference On Corporate Governence, Accra Ghana, 53, 
1689– 1699. Http://Doi.Org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Adenike, O., & Ayorinde, F. (2009). Ownership structure, Ccorporate Governance 
and Corporate Performance: The case of Nigerian Quoted companies. In 
Final report Presented at the AERC Biannual Research series. Nairobi, 
Kenya. 
Adjaoud, F., & Ben,Amar, W. (2010). Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy: 
Shareholders’ Protection or Expropriation? Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 37(5, 6), 648–667. 
Agrawal, A., & Knoeber, C. R. (1996). Firm Performance and Mechanisms to 
Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31(03), 377-397.  
95 
 
Ahmed, N., Ahmed, Z., & Ahmed, I. (2010). Determinants of Capital Structure: A 
Case of Life Insurance Sector of Pakistan. European Journal of Economics, 
Finance and Administrative Sciences, 24, 7–12. 
Akindele, R. I. (2012). Risk Management and Corporate Governance Performance-
Empirical Evidence From the Nigerian Banking Sector. IFE Psychologia: An 
International Journal, 20(1), 103-120. 
Al-Abbas, M. (2009). Corporate Governance and Earnings Management: An 
Empirical Study of the Saudi Market. Journal of American Academy of 
Business, Cambridge, Hollywood, 15(1), 301-310.  
Alabede, J. O. (2012). The Intervening Effect of Global Financial Condition on the 
Determinants of Bank Performance: Evidence from Nigeria. Accounting and 
Finance Research, 1(2), 161-176. Doi:10.5430/Afr.V1n2p161 
Al-Ajmi, J. (2008). Audit and Reporting Delays: Evidence from an Emerging 
Market. Advances in Accounting, 24(2), 217–226. 
Alexander, J, Fennell, M and Halpern, M (1993): Leadership Instability In Hospitals: 
The Influence Of Board- CEO Relations And Organization Growth And 
Decline. Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 38, Pp. 74-99. 
Alfiero, S., & Venuti, F. (2016). The Impact of Corporate Governance on Risk 
Taking in European Insurance Industry. WORLD ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, 
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, 10(1), 190-194. 
Al-Ghamdi, S. A. (2012). Investigation into Earnings Management Practices and the 
Role of Corporate Governance and External Audit in Emerging Markets: 
Empirical Evidence from Saudi Listed Companies (Doctoral Dissertation, 
Durham Niversity).  
Aljifri, K., & Moustafa, M. (2007). The Impact of Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms on the Performance of UAE Firms: An Empirical Analysis. 
Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, 23(2), 71-93.  
Al-Manaseer, M. F. A., Al-Hindawi, R. M., Al-Dahiyat, M. A., & Sartawi, I. I. 
(2012).  The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Performance of 
Jordanian Banks. European Journal of Scientific Research, 67(3), 349–359. 
Al-Matari, E. M., Al-Swidi, A. K., Fadzil, F. H., & Al-Matari, Y. A. (2012). The 
Impact of Board Characteristics on Firm Performance: Evidence from 
Nonfinancial Listed Companies In Kuwaiti Stock Exchange. International 
Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 2(2), 310. 
Alzharani, A. M., Che Ahmad, A. B., & Aljaaidi, K., S. (2011). An Empirical 
Investigation Of Factors Associated With Firm Performance: Evidence From 
Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia. International Conference on E-Business, 
Management and Economics, 25, 30-36. Abor, J., & Fiador, V. (2013). Does 
Corporate Governance Explain Dividend Policy In Sub-Saharan Africa? 
International Journal of Law and Management, 55(3), 201– 225. 
96 
 
Amran, N. A. (2010). Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Succession Planning and 
Firm Performance: Evidence from Malaysian Family and Non-Family 
Controlled Companies. (Doctoral Dissertation, Niversiti Tara Malaysia).  
Amran, N. A., & Che Ahmad, A. (2009). Family Business, Board Dynamics and 
Firm Value: Evidence from Malaysia. Journal of Financial Reporting and 
Accounting, 7(1), 53-74.  
Amran, N. A., & Che Ahmad, A. (2010). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and 
Performance: Analysis of Malaysian Family And Non-Family Controlled 
Companies. Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing, 6(2), 1-15.  
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board Characteristics, 
Accounting Report Integrity, And The Cost Of Debt. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, 37(3), 315–342. 
Anderson, T., & Zeghal, D. (1994). The Pricing of Audit Services: Further Evidence 
from the Canadian Market. Accounting and Business Research, 24(95), 195–
207 
Arshad, Z., Akram, Y., Amjad, M., & Usman, M. (2013). Ownership Structure and 
Dividend Policy. Interdisciplinary Journal of Contemporary Research in 
Business, 5(3), 378–401. 
Arun, T.G and Turner, J. D. (2002b): Corporate Governance of Banking Institutions 
in Developing Economies: The Indian Experience. Paper Presented In the 
Conference on Finance and Development‟ Organized By IDPM, the 
University Of Manchester. 23rd July, 2002. 
Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. W., Kinney, W. R., & Lafond, R. (2009). The 
Effect Ofsox Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 47(1), 1–43, 
Http://Doi.Org/10.1111/J.1475- 679X.2008.00315.X 
Asika, N. (2004). Research Methodology in the Behavioral Science. Lagos, Nigeria: 
Longman Nigeria Plc. 
Asteriou, D. And Hall, S. G. (2007). Applied Econometrics: A Modern Approach 
Usinf Eviews And Microfit, New York, Palgrave Macmillian; USA. 
Australian Institute Of Companies Directors, 1-24. 
Balgati, H.B. (2008). Forecasting With Panel Data. Journal of Forecasting, 27, 153-
173. 
Baltagi, B. H., Bratberg, E., & Holmås, T. H. (2005). A Panel Data Study of 
Physicians’ Labor Supply: The Case of Norway. Health Economics, 14(10), 
1035–1045. 
Barth, J. R., Caprio Jr, G., & Levine, R. (2001). Banking systems around the globe: 
Do regulation and ownership affect performance and stability? In Prudential 
97 
 
supervision: What works and what doesn’t (pp. 31–96). University of 
Chicago Press. 
Battaglia, F., & Gallo, A. (2015). Risk Governance and Asian Bank Performance: 
An Empirical Investigation over the Financial Crisis. Emerging Markets 
Review, 25, 53-68 
Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. (1985). Corporate Governance and the Board of 
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. Journal 
of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1(1), 101–124. 
Beasley, M. S., Clune, R., & Hermanson, D. R. (2005). Enterprise Risk 
Management: An Empirical Analysis Of Factors Associated With The Extent 
Of Implementation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 24(6), 521-
531. 
Bédard, J., Chtourou, S.H. And Courteau, L. (2004), “The Effect of Audit 
Committee Expertise, Independence, and Activity on Aggressive Earnings 
Management”, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 23, 
Pp. 13‐35.  
Beltratti, A. And Stulz, R. (2012) the Credit Crisis around the Globe: Why Did Some 
Banks Perform Better? Journal of Financial Economics, 105(1), Pp. 1–17 
Benz, M., & Frey, B. S. (2007). Corporate governance: What can we learn from 
public governance?. Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 92-104. 
Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2000). The Non-Correlation between Board Independence 
and Long Term Firm Performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 1(1), 231–
274. Http://Doi.Org/10.2139/Ssrn.133808 
Birnbaum, P. H. (1984). The Choice of Strategic Alternatives under Increasing 
Regulation in High Technology Companies. Academy Of Management 
Journal, 27(3), 489-510.  
Blau, P. M., & Scott, W. R. (1962). Formal Organizations: A Comparative 
Approach. Stanford University Press 
Block, S. (1999). The Role of Non-Affiliated Outside Directors in Monitoring the 
Firm and the Effect on Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial and 
Strategic Decisions, 12(1), 1-8.  
Bonn, I., Yoshikawa, T., & Phan, P. H. (2004). Effects of Board Structure on Firm 
Performance: A Comparison between Japan and Australia. Asian Business & 
Management, 3(1), 105–125. 
Brown, L. D., & Caylor, M. L. (2004). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
.Available At SSRN 586423 
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011). Corporate Governance, Accounting 
and Finance: A Review. Accounting and Finance, 51(1), 96-172.  
98 
 
Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? 
Evidence from Tender Offer Bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 
195-221  
Byrd, J. W., & Hickman, K. A. (1992). Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers? 
Evidence from Tender Offer Bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 
195-221  
Campbell, J. L., Chen, H., Dhaliwal, D. S., Lu, H. M., & Steele, L. B. (2014). The 
Information Content of Mandatory Risk Factor Disclosures in Corporate 
Filings. Review of Accounting Studies, 19(1), 396-455. 
Carneiro, L. A. F. (2006). Corporate Risk Management with Reinsurance and 
Derivatives: Panel Data Methodology and New Results from Empirical 
Studies Using Australian Data. University Of New South Wales. 
Chahine, S., & Tohmé, N. S. (2009). Is CEO Duality Always Negative? An 
Exploration of CEO Duality and Ownership Structure in the Arab IPO 
Context. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(2), 123-141.  
Chakrabarti, R. (2006). Corporate Governance in India – Evolution and Challenges. 
College of Management, Atlanta Georgia, USA, 1–30. 
Chen, K. Y., Elder, R. J., & Hsieh, Y.-M. (2007). Corporate Governance and 
Earnings Management: The Implications of Corporate Governance Best-
Practice Principles for Taiwanese Listed Companies. Journal of 
Contemporary Accounting & Economics, 3(2), 73–105. 
Chen, Y. M., Moroney, R., & Houghton, K. (2005). Audit Committee Composition 
and the Use of An Industry Specialist Audit Firm. Accounting & Finance, 
45(2), 217-239.  
Cheung, Y., Thomas Connelly, J., Limpaphayom, P., & Zhou, L. (2007). Do 
investors really value corporate governance? Evidence from the Hong Kong 
market. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, 
18(2), 86–122. 
Chiemeke, S. C., Evwiekpaefe, A. E., & Chete, F. O. (2006). The adoption of Internet 
banking in Nigeria: An empirical investigation. Journal of Internet Banking 
and Commerce, 11(3), 1–10. 
Cicero, D., Wintoki, M., & Yang, T. (2010). Do Firms Adjust To A Target Board 
Structure? In CELS 2009 4th Annual Conference On Empirical Legal Studies 
Paper, Is Available Online At 
Http://Corporategovernancecenter.Org/Research/ Cirmay11.Pdf.  
Clarke, G., Cull, R., Peria, M., & Sánchez, S. (2005). Bank Lending To Small 
Businesses in Latin America: Does Bank Origin Matter? Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 37(1), 83–118. Http://Doi.Org/10.2307/3838938.  
Coleman, A. And Nicholas- Biekpe, N. (2006): Does Board and CEO Matter For 
Bank Performance? A Comparative Analysis Of Banks In Ghana, Journal of 
99 
 
Business Management, University Of Stellenbosch Business School (USB), 
Cape Town, South Africa Vol.13, Pp.46- 9. 
Coles, J. W., Mcwilliams, V. B., & Sen, N. (2001). An Examination of the 
Relationship of Governance Mechanisms to Performance. Journal of 
Management, 27(1), 23–50. 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. (2004). 
Enterprise Risk Management Framework. American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, New York. 
Connelly, B. L., Certo, S. T., Ireland, R. D., & Reutzel, C. R. (2011). Signaling 
Theory: A Review and Assessment. Journal of Management, 37(1), 39-67. 
Cornett, M. M., Guo, L., Shahriar, K., & Tehranian, H. (2005). The Impact of 
Corporate Governance on Performance Differences in Privately-Owned 
Versus State-Owned Bankd: An International Coomparison, 1, 1–57. 
Http://Doi.Org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1993). Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: 
Controland Performance Implications. Entrepreneurship: Theory and 
Practice, 17(3), 65– 82. 
Daily, C. M., Dalton, D. R., & Cannella, A. A. (2003). Corporate Governance: 
Decades Ofdialogue and Data. Academy Of Management Review, 28(3), 
371–382. 
Dalton, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (2005). Boards of Directors: Utilizing Empirical 
Evidence in Developing Practical Prescriptions. British Journal of 
Management, 16(S1), S91– S97. 
Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Johnson, J. L., & Ellstrand, A. E. (1999). Number of 
Directors and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Academy Of 
Management Journal, 42(6), 674-686.  
Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E. And Johnson, J.L. (1998), “Meta-Analytic 
Reviews of Board Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial 
Performance”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19 No. 1, Pp. 269-290. 
Darmadi, S. (2013). Board Members' Education and Firm Performance: Evidence 
from a Developing Economy. International Journal of Commerce and 
Management, 23(2), 113-135. 
Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward A Stewardship 
Theory of Management. Academy Of Management Review, 22(1), 20–47 
Http://Doi.Org/10.5465/AMR.1997.9707180258 
De Andres, P. And Vallelado, E. (2008) Corporate Governance in Banking: The Role 
of the Board of Directors, Journal of Banking & Finance, 32 (12), Pp. 2570–
2580 
100 
 
De Andres, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate Boards in OECD 
Countries: Size, Composition, Functioning and Effectiveness. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 3(2), 197–210. 
De Andres, P., Azofra, V., & Lopez, F. (2005). Corporate Boards in OECD 
Countries: Size, Composition, Functioning and Effectiveness. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 13(2), 197–210. 
De Lacy, G. (2005). How To Review And Assess The Value Of Board Subcommittees. 
Dedman, E. (2000). An investigation into the determinants of UK board structure 
before and after Cadbury. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
8(2), 133–153. 
Dionne, G., & Triki, T. (2005). Risk management and corporate governance: The 
importance of independence and financial knowledge for the board and the 
audit committee. Cahier de recherche/Working Paper, 5, 15. 
Economy, Management and Social Sciences, 2(6), 237–241. 
Eisenberg, T, Sundgren, S, And Wells, M. T (1998): Larger Board Size and 
Decreasing Firm Value In Small Firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 48, Pp. 35-54. 
El-Chaarani, H. (2014). The Impact of Corporate Governance on the Performance of 
Lebenese Banks. The International Journal of Business and Finance 
Research, 8(5), 35–46. http://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.2007.699613 
Epps, R. W., & Cereola, S. J. (2008). Do Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
Corporate Governance Ratings Reflect A Company's Operating 
Performance? Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 19(8), 1135-1148. 
Evans, D. S. (1987). The Relationship between Firm Growth, Size, and Age: 
Estimates for 100 Manufacturing Industries. The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 567–581. 
Evans, D. S. (1987). The Relationship between Firm Growth, Size, and Age: 
Estimates for 100 Manufacturing Industries. The Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 567–581. 
Exchange, N. S. (2009). Nigerian Stock Exchange History. 
Ezeoha, A. E. (2011). Banking Consolidation, Credit Crisis, and Asset Quality in a 
Fragile Banking System: Some Evidence from Nigerian Data. Journal of 
Financial 
Fama, E. And Jensen, M. (1983) Seperatation of Owership and Control, Journal of 
Law and Economics, XXVI, Pp. 1 – 30 
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. The 
Journal of Law & Economics, 26(2), 301–325. 
101 
 
Ferrer, R. C., Banderlipe, I. I., & Mc Reynald, S. (2012). The Influence of Corporate 
Board Characteristics on Firm Performance of Publicly Listed Property 
Companies in the Philippines. Academy Of Accounting and Financial Studies 
Journal, 16(4), 123- 142.  
Finegold, D., Benson, G. S., & Hecht, D. (2007). Corporate Boards And Company 
Performance: Review of Research In Light Of Recent Reforms. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(5), 865-878.  
Fleischer, A., Hazard, G. C., & Klipper, M. Z. (1988). Board games. Boston, MA: 
Little, Brown, & Company. 
Ford, H. A. J., Austin, R. P. & Ramsay, I. M. (1999). Ford’s Principle Of 
Corporation’s. Law 9th Edition, Butter Worths, Sydney. 
Fox, J. (1991). Regression diagnostics: An introduction (Vol. 79). Sage. 
Genser, B., Cooper, P. J., Yazdanbakhsh, M., Barreto, M. L., & Rodrigues, L. C. 
(2007). A Guide to Modern Statistical Analysis of Immunological Data. 
BMC Immunology, 8(1), 1. 
Ghabayen, M. A. (2012). Board Characteristics and Firm Performance: Case of 
Saudi Arabia. International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting, 
2(2), 168. 
Ghosh, S. (2006). Do Board Characteristics Affect Corporate Performance? Firm-
Level Evidence for India. Applied Economics Letters, 13(7), 435–443. 
Ghosh, S. (2006). Do Board Characteristics Affect Corporate Performance? Firm-
Level Evidence for India. Applied Economics Letters, 13(7), 435–443. 
Gibson, B., & Cassar, G. (2005). Longitudinal analysis of relationships between 
planning and performance in small firms. Small Business Economics, 25(3), 
207–222. 
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The Effects of Board Size and 
Diversity on Strategic Change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 241-
250.  
Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., & Tseng, C. Y. (2009). Enterprise Risk Management 
and Firm Performance: A Contingency Perspective. Journal of Accounting 
and Public Policy, 28(4), 301-327. 
Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric Analysis. Pearson Education India. 
Greene, W. H. (2008). Econometric Approach to Efficiency Analysis. Oxford 
University Press; USA 
Gujarati, D. N. (2004). Econométrie. De Boeck Superieur. 
Gujarati, D. N., & Porter, D. (2009). Basic Econometrics Mc Graw-Hill International 
Edition. 
102 
 
Gujarati, D. N., & Porter, D. C. (2009). Causality in Economics: The Granger 
Causality Test. Basic Econometrics (Fifth International Ed.). New York: 
Mcgraw-Hill, 652–658. 
Hair Jr, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & William, C. Black. (1995). 
Multivariate Data Analysis, 4. 
Hair Jr, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2010). 
SEM: An Introduction. Multivariate Data Analysis: A Global Perspective, 
629–686. 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2006). 
Multivariate Data Analysis (Vol. 6). Pearson Prentice Hall Upper Saddle 
River, NJ. 
Halim, E. H., Mustika, G., Sari, R. N., Anugerah, R., & Mohd-Sanusi, Z. (2017). 
Corporate Governance Practices and Financial Performance: The Mediating 
Effect of Risk Management Committee at Manufacturing 
Firms. Studies, 10(4), 272-289 
Haniffa, R., & Hudaib, M. (2006). Corporate Governance Structure and Performance 
Ofmalaysian Listed Companies. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
33(7, 8), 1034–1062. 
Haye, E. (2014). Dividend Policy and Agency Effects: A Look at Financial Firms. 
International Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(2), 8. 
Healy, J. F. (2002). Statistics: A Tool For Social Research, 6th Edition, Wad Worth 
Thompson Learning, United States. 
Heidi, V. B., & Marleen, W. (2003). Voluntary disclosure on corporate governance 
in the European Union. Dept of Applied Economics, University of London. 
Henderson, B. C., & Kaplan, S. E. (2000). An Examination of Audit Report Lag for 
Banks: A Panel Data Approach. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory, 
19(2), 159 174. 
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (1988). The Determinants of Board 
Composition. The RAND Journal of Economics, 589-606.  
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: 
Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives. Academy Of 
Management Review, 28(3), 383-396.  
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: 
Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives. Academy Of 
Management Review, 28(3), 383- 396.  
Hoyt, R. E., & Liebenberg, A. P. (2011). The Value of Enterprise Risk Management. 
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(4), 795-822. 
103 
 
Hoyt, R. E., & Liebenberg, A. P. (2011). The Value of Enterprise Risk 
Management. Journal of Risk and Insurance, 78(4), 795-822. 
Huda, N., & Abdullah, M. N. (2013). Relationship between Ownership Structure and 
Dividend Policy: Empirical Evidence from Chittagong Stock Exchange. In 
Proceedings of 9th Asian Business Research Conference (Vol. 1, P. 22). 
Ibrahim, H., & Samad, F. A. (2011). Corporate Governance Mechanisms and 
Performance of Public-Listed Family-Ownership in Malaysia. International 
Journal of Economics and Finance, 3(1), 105. 
Idemudia, U. (2011). Corporate Social Responsibility and Developing Countries: 
Moving the Critical CSR Research Agenda in Africa Forward. Progress in 
Development Studies, 11(1), 1-18. 
Jarvis, L. (2005). Risk Aversion Hits Biotech Market. Chemical Market Reporter, 
268(2), 34-35. 
Jenkinson, T., & Mayer, C. (1992). The assessment: corporate governance and 
corporate control. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 8(3), 1–10. 
Jensen, M. C. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of 
Internal Control Systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880. 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 
3(4), 305– 360. 
Johannisson, B., & Huse, M. (2000). Recruiting Outside Board Members in the 
Small Family Business: An Ideological Challenge. Entrepreneurship & 
Regional Development, 12(4), 353- 78.  
Judge, W. Q., Naoumova, I., & Koutzevol, N. (2003). Corporate Governance and 
Firm Performance in Russia: An Empirical Study. Journal of World 
Business, 38(4), 385– 396. 
Kajola, S. O. (2008). Corporate Governance And Firm Performance! The Case Of 
Nigerian Listed Firms. European Journal of Economics, Finance and 
Administrative Sciences, 14(14), 16–28. 
Http://Doi.Org/10.1016/J.Jcorpfin.2008.03.006 
Kallamu, B. S., (2015). Risk Management Committee Attributes and Firm 
Performance. International Finance and Banking Vol. 2, No. 2, ISSN 2374-
2089 
Kesner, I. F. (1988). Directors' Characteristics and Committee Membership: An 
Investigation of Type, Occupation, Tenure, and Gender. Academy Of 
Management Journal, 31(1), 66-84.  
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board Composition And Corporate 
Performance: How The Australian Experience Informs Contrasting Theories 
104 
 
of Corporate Governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
11(3), 189-205.  
Kim, P. Kwee, Rasiah, D., & Tasnim, R. B. (2012). A Review of Corporate 
Governance: Ownership Structure of Domestic-Owned Banks in Term of 
Government Connected Ownership, and Foreign Ownership of Commercial 
Banks in Malaysia. The Journal of Organizational Management Studies, 
2012(21), 1–18. Http://Doi.Org/10.5171/2012.335681 
Kimberly, J. R., & Evanisko, M. J. (1981). Organizational Innovation: The Influence 
of Individual, Organizational, and Contextual Factors on Hospital Adoption 
of Technological and Administrative Innovations. Academy of Management 
Journal, 24(4), 689-713.  
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2003). Corporate governance, investor protection, and 
performance in emerging markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(5), 703–
728. 
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2003). Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and 
Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(5), 
703–728. 
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2003). Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and 
Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(5), 
703–728. 
Klapper, L. F., & Love, I. (2003). Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and 
Performance in Emerging Markets. Journal of Corporate Finance, 10(5), 
703–728. 
Klein, A. (1998). Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure 1. The Journal 
of Law and Economics, 41(1), 275-304. 
Köke, J., & Renneboog, L. (2002). Does good corporate governance lead to stronger 
productivity growth?. Tilburg University. 
Kolapo, T. F., Ayeni, R. K., & Oke, M. O. (2012). Credit risk and commercial banks 
performance in Nigeria: A panel model approach. Australian Journal of 
Business and Management Research, 2(2), 31. 
Kothari, S. P. (2001). Capital Markets Research in Accounting. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 31(1), 105–231. 
Kurawa, J. M., & Kabara, A. S. (2014, April). Impact of corporate governance on 
voluntary disclosure by firms in the downstream sector of the Nigerian 
petroleum industry. In World Business Research Conference (pp. 21-23). 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A. (2007). ‘Corporate Governance And Firm Performance In 
Africa:A  Dynamic Panel Approach. In International Conference on 
Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets, Sabanci University, Istanbul, 
November 
105 
 
Kyereboah-Coleman, A., & Biekpe, N. (2005). Corporate Governance and the 
Performance Of Microfinance Institutions (Mfis) In Ghana. Working Paper, 
UGBS, Legon. 
Lang, M. H., Lins, K. V., & Miller, D. P. (2004). Concentrated Control, Analyst 
Following, And Valuation: Do Analysts Matter Most When Investors Are 
Protected Least? Journal Of Accounting Research, 42(3), 589-623.  
Lefort, F., & Urzúa, F. (2008). Board Independence, Firm Performance and 
Ownership Concentration: Evidence from Chile. Journal of Business 
Research, 61(6), 615–622. 
Lehn, K. M., Patro, S., & Zhao, M. (2009). Determinants of the Size and 
Composition of US Corporate Boards: 1935, 2000. Financial Management, 
38(4), 747–780. 
Leruth, M. L. E., Khatri, M. Y., & Piesse, M. J. (2002). Corporate Performance and 
Governance in Malaysia. International Monetary Fund. 
Linck, J. S., Netter, J. M., & Yang, T. (2008). The determinants of board structure. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), 308–328. 
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate 
governance. The Business Lawyer, 59–77. 
Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate 
Governance. The Business Lawyer, 59–77. 
Macey, J. R. And O‟Hara, M. (2001): The Corporate Governance of Banks, 
Economic Policy Review Vol. 16, and No2 Pp 89- 102. 
Mak, Y. T., & Li, Y. (2001). Determinants of Corporate Ownership and Board 
Structure: Evidence from Singapore. Journal of Corporate Finance, 7(3), 
235–256. 
Makki, M. A. M., & Lodhi, S. A. (2014). Impact of Corporate Governance on 
Intellectual Capital Efficiency and Financial Performance. Pakistan Journal 
of Commerce & Social Sciences, 8(2). 
Mallin, C. (2012). Institutional investors: the vote as a tool of governance. Journal 
of Management & Governance, 16(2), 177–196. 
Mangena, M., & Pike, R. (2005). The effect of audit committee shareholding, 
financial expertise and size on interim financial disclosures. Accounting and 
Business Research, 35(4), 327-349. 
Mansourinia, E., Emamgholipour, M., Rekabdarkolaei, E. A., & Hozoori, M. (2013). 
The Effect of Board Size, Board Independence and CEO Duality on Dividend 
Policy of Companies: Evidence from Tehran Stock Exchange. International 
Journal of 
106 
 
Mayer, C (1999): Corporate Governance in the UK. A Paper Presented At The 
Conference On Corporate Governance: A Comparative Perspective, Held In 
University Of Oxford On 16th October. 
McGee, R. W., & Bose, S. (2007). The Ethics of Tax Evassion: A Survey of 
Ausralian Opinion, (April), 1–25. 
http://doi.org/dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.979410 
Miller, A., Boehlje, M., & Dobbins, C. (2001). Key Financial Performance Measures 
for Farm General Managers. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University 
Cooperative Extension Service Publication ID-243, 5. 
Miller, D. J. (1995). CEO Salary Increases May Be Rational After All: Referents 
And Contracts In CEO Pay. Academy Of Management Journal, 38(5), 1361–
1385. 
Minton, B. A., Taillard, J., & Williamson, R. (2011). Do independence and financial 
expertise of the board matter for risk taking and performance? 
Minton, B., Taillard, J., & Williamson, R. (2010). Board composition, risk taking 
and value: Evidence from financial firms. SSRN Electronic Journal. 
Mintzberg, H. (1979). An Emerging Strategy of“Direct” Research. Administrative 
Sciencequarterly, 582–589 
Moran, C. A. (2010). International Corporate Governance (2nd Ed.). Harvard 
University 
Musa, S. (2014). The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Dividend 
Payoutratio: Evidence from Malaysia. Universiti Utara Malaysia. 
Nguyen, D. D. L., Hagendorff, J., & Eshraghi, A. (2015). Which executive 
characteristics create value in banking? Evidence from appointment 
announcements. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 23(2), 
112-128. 
Nicholson, G. J., & Kiel, G. C. (2007). Can Directors Impact Performance? A case‐
based test of three theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 15(4), 585-608.  
Nimalathasan, B. (2008). A Comparative Study of Financial Performance of Banking 
Sector in Bangladesh. An Application of CAMELS Rating System. 
Universitatii Bucuresti. Analele. Seria Stiinte Economice Si Administrative, 
2, 133. 
Obeten, O. I., Ocheni, S., & John, S. (2014). The Effects of Corporate Governance 
on the Performance of Commercial Banks in Nigeria. International Journal 
of Public Administration and Management Research, 2. 
Ofo, N. (2011). Code of Corporate Governance for Banks in Nigeria Post-
Consolidation 2006: Revision Required. SSRN Electronic Journal, 1–35. 
http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1751460 
107 
 
Ogbechie, C. (2006). Corporate Governance A Challenge For Nigerian Banks. Cited 
From Www. Businessdayonline. Com. Viewed on, 7(8), 2007. 
Okpara, J. O. (2010). Perspectives on Corporate Governance Challenges in a Sub- 
Saharan African Economy. Journal of Business & Policy Research, 5(1), 
110–122.Retrievedfrom http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228433082 
Olannye, A. P., & David, A. (2014). Corporate governance and organizational 
performance in the Nigerian banking industry. Journal of Emerging Trends 
in Economics and Management Sciences, 5(6), 525. 
Oman, C. P. (2001), Corporate Governance and National Development, OECD 
Development Center Technical Papers, Number 180 Pp. 362-388. 
Oyebode, A. (2009). The imperative of Corporate Management in Nigeria. Nigerian 
Village Square. 
Oyerinde, A. A. (2014). Corporate Governance and Bank Performance in Nigeria: 
Further Evidence from Nigeria. International Journal of Business and 
Management, 9(8), 133. 
Pandya, H. (2011). Corporate Governance Structures and Financial Performance of 
Selected Indian Banks. Journal of Management & Public Policy, 2(2), 4–22. 
Patro, S., Lehn, K., & Zhao, M. (2003). Determinants of the Size and Structure of 
Corporate Boards: 1935-2000. Financial Management, 38, 2009. 
Patro, S., Lehn, K., & Zhao, M. (2003). Determinants of the Size and Structure of 
Corporate Boards: 1935-2000. Financial Management, 38, 2009. 
Pearce, J. A., & Zahra, S. A. (1992). Board Composition from a Strategic 
Contingency Perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 29(4), 411-438  
Peni, E. And Vähämaa, S. (2012) Did Good Corporate Governance Improvide Bank 
Performance during the Financial Crisis? Journal of Financial Services 
Research, 41, Pp. 19 – 35 
Pfeffer, J (1972); Size, Composition, and Function of Hospital Boards of Directors, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 18, Pp. 349-364. 
Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The 
Organization and Its Environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 218–
228. 
Pfeffer, J. (1983). Organizational Demography. In B. Staw & L. Cummings (Eds), 
Research in Organizational Behavior, 5, 329-357. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press  
Poitevin, M. (1990). Strategic Financial Signalling. International Journal of 
Industrial Organization, 8(4), 499-518. 
108 
 
Ponnu, C. H., & Karthigeyan, R. M. (2010). Board independence and corporate 
performance: Evidence from Malaysia. African journal of business 
management, 4(6), 858. 
Ponnu, C. H., & Karthigeyan, R. M. (2010). Board Independence and Corporate 
Performance: Evidence from Malaysia. Afr. J. Bus. Manage, 4(6), 858-868.  
Qi, D., Wu, W., & Zhang, H. (2000). Shareholding structure and corporate 
performance of partially privatized firms: Evidence from listed Chinese 
companies. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 8(5), 587-610.  
Qian, G., Khoury, T. A., Peng, M. W., & Qian, Z. (2010). The Performance 
Implications Of Intra,And Inter,Regional Geographic Diversification. 
Strategic Management Journal, 31(9), 1018–1030. 
Quadri, H. A. (2010). Conceptual Framework for Corporate Governance in Nigeria 
–Challenges and Panaceas. PM World Collection, XII (Ix), 1–8. 
Ramli, N. M. (2010). Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: Evidence from 
Malaysian Companies. International Review of Business Research Papers, 
6(1), 170–180. 
Ramli, N. M. (2010). Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: Evidence from 
Malaysian Companies. International Review of Business Research Papers, 
6(1), 170–180 
Rao, K. S., & Jirra, T. D. (2017). Corporate governance, diversification, and risk 
management in commercial banks of Ethiopia. Corporate governance, 3(2). 
Rashid, A., De Zoysa, A., Lodh, S., & Rudkin, K. (2010). Board Composition and 
Firm Performance: Evidence from Bangladesh. Australasian Accounting 
Business and Finance Journal, 4(1), 76-95.  
Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO Duality and Organizational 
Performance:  Alongitudinal Analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 
12(2), 155–160. 
Rehmans, R. Ur, & Mangla, I. U. (2010). Corporate Governance and Performance 
of Financial Institutions In Pakistan: A Comparison Between Conventional 
And Islamic Banks In Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review, 49(4), 
461–475. Retrieved From Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/41428669 
Rhoades, L., Eisenberger, R., & Armeli, S. (2001). Affective Commitment to the 
Organization: The Contribution of Perceived Organizational Support. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 86(5) 825. 
Rittenberg, L. E., & Miller, P. K. (2005). Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Work: 
Looking At the Benefits. The IIA Research Foundation 
Rogers, D. A. (2002). Does Executive Portfolio Structure Affect Risk Management? 
CEO Risk- Aking Incentives and Corporate Derivatives Usage. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 26(2), 271-295. 
109 
 
Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1997). Inside Directors, Board Effectiveness, and 
Shareholder Wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 44(2), 229-250.  
Ross, S. A. (1973). The economic theory of agency: The principal’s problem. The 
American Economic Review, 63(2), 134–139. 
Ruigrok, W., Peck, S., Tacheva, S., Greve, P., & Hu, Y. (2006). The determinants 
and effects of board nomination committees. Journal of Management & 
Governance, 10(2), 119-148. 
Sánchez-Ballesta, J. P., & García-Meca, E. (2005). Influencia de la Empresa en los 
errores de Predicción de los Analistas Financieros: un Estudio Meta-
analítico. Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting/Revista Española de 
Financiación y Contabilidad, 34(127), 823-848. 
Sanda, A. U., Mikailu, A. S., & Garba, T. (2005). Corporate Governance 
Mechanisms and Firms’ Financial Performance in Nigeria. The African 
Economic Research Consortium (Vol. 2). 
Http://Doi.Org/10.1504/AAJFA.2010.035193 
Sanusi, L. S. (2010). The Nigerian Banking Industry: what went wrong and the way 
forward. Delivered at Annual Convocation Ceremony of Bayero University, 
Kano Held on, 3(1), 2010. 
Shakir, R. (2008). Board size, executive directors and property firm performance in 
Malaysia. Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, 14(1), 66–80. 
Shakir, R. (2008). Board Size, Executive Directors and Property Firm Performance 
in Malaysia. Pacific Rim Property Research Journal, 14(1), 66–80. 
Shleifer, A. And Vishny, R.W. (1996), “A Survey of Corporate Governance”, Vol. 
52 No. 2, Pp. 737-783 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal 
of Finance, 52(2), 737–783. 
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal 
of Finance, 52(2), 737–783. 
Simonoff, J. S., & Tsai, C.-L. (1999). Semiparametric and additive model selection 
using an improved Akaike information criterion. Journal of Computational 
and Graphical Statistics, 8(1), 22–40. 
Soludo, C. C. (2004). Consolidating the Nigerian banking industry to meet the 
development challenges of the 21st century. In An address delivered to the 
special meeting of Bankers’ Committee-CBN, Abuja. 
Soludo, C. C. (2004). Consolidating the Nigerian banking industry to meet the 
development challenges of the 21st century. In An address delivered to the 
special meeting of Bankers’ Committee-CBN, Abuja. 
110 
 
Spence, M. (1974). Competitive and Optimal Responses to Signals: An Analysis of 
Efficiency and Distribution. Journal of Economic Theory, 7(3), 296-332. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1965). Organizations and Social Structure. Handbook of 
Organizations, 44(2), 142–193. 
Stinchcombe, A. L. (1965). Organizations and Social Structure. Handbook of 
Organizations, 44(2), 142–193. 
Suberu, O. J., & Aremu, O. S. (2010). Corporate Governance and Merger Activity 
in Thenigerian Banking Industry. J Economics, 1(2), 91–97. 
Subramaniam, N., Mcmanus, L., & Zhang, J. (2009). Corporate Governance, Firm 
Characteristics and Risk Management Committee Formation in Australian 
Companies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 24(4), 316-339 
Sullivan, J. D. (2002). Corporate Governance! Transparency between Government 
and Business. In Mediterranean Development Forum, 3, 1–14. 
Switzer, L. N., & Huang, Y. (2007). How Does Human Capital Affect the 
Performance of Small And Mid-Cap Mutual Funds? Journal of Intellectual 
Capital, 8(4), 666-681.  
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Multivariate Analysis of Variance and 
Covariance. Using Multivariate Statistics, 3, 402–407. 
Tao, N. B., & Hutchinson, M. (2012). Corporate Governance and Risk Management 
Committee: The Role Risk Management and Compensation Committees. 
[Online] Available: Http://Ssrn.Com/Abstract=1979895 
Thompson, M. (2006). Representing data distributions with kernel density estimates. 
AMC Technical Brief, (4), 1–2. 
Uadiale, O. M. (2010). The Impact of Board Structure on Corporate Financial 
Performance in Nigeria. International Journal of Business and Management, 
5(10), 155. 
Uadiale, O. M. (2010). The Impact of Board Structure on Corporate Financial 
Performance in Nigeria. International Journal of Business and Management, 
5(10), 155–166. 
Upadhyay, A. D., Bhargava, R., & Faircloth, S. D. (2014). Board structure and role 
of monitoring committees. Journal of Business Research, 67(7), 1486-1492. 
Uzun, H., Szewczky, S.H. And Varma, R. (2004), “Board Composition and 
Corporate Fraud”, Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 60, Pp. 33-43 
Vafeas, N. (2000). Board Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy, 19(2), 139–160. 
111 
 
Vives, X. (2000): Corporate Governance: Does It Matter, In Xavier Vives (Ed.) 
Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Vives, X. (2011). Competition Policy in Banking. Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 27, 479-497. Doi:10.1093/Oxrep/Grr021 
Waweru, N. (2014). Determinants of Quality Corporate Governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa: Evidence from Kenya and South Africa. Managerial Auditing 
Journal, 29(5), 455-485. 
Wen, W. (2010). Ownership Structure and Banking Performance: New Evidence in 
China. Universitat Autònoma De Barcelona Departament D’economia De 
L’empresa 
Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. A. (1992). Top Management Team Demography and 
Corporate Strategic Change. The Academy Of Management Journal, 35(1), 
91-121  
Wooldridge, J. M. (2003). Cluster-Sample Methods in Applied Econometrics. The 
American Economic Review, 93(2), 133–138. 
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. 
MIT Press 
Wu, J., Xu, D., & Phan, P. H. (2011). The Effects of Ownership Concentration and 
Corporate Debt on Corporate Divestitures in Chinese Listed Firms. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1), 95–114. 
Wu, Y. C., Kweh, Q. L., Lu, W. M., & Azizan, N. A. (2016). The impacts of risk-
management committee characteristics and prestige on efficiency. Journal of 
the Operational Research Society, 67(6), 813-829. 
Xie, B., Davidson 111, W. N., & Dadalt, P. J. (2003). Earnings Management and 
Corporate Governance: The Role of the Board and the Audit Committee. 
Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(3), 295-3 16. 
Yammeesri, J., & Herath, S. K. (2010). Board Characteristics and Corporate Value: 
Evidence from Thailand. Corporate Governance, 10(3), 279-292.  
Yatim, P. (2009). Audit Committee Characteristics and Risk Management of 
Malaysian Listed Firms. Malaysian Accounting Review, 8(1), 19-36. 
Yermack, D. (1996). Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of 
Directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211.  
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 
15(2), 291– 334. 
112 
 
Zainal Abidin, Z., Mustaffa Kamal, N. & Jusoff, K. (2009). Board Structure and 
Corporate Performance In Malaysia. International Journal of Economics and 
Finance, 1(1), P150.  
